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Discovery of Nonparties' Tangible Things Under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Sarah N Welling * 
I. Introduction 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37 1 describe proce-
dures for pretrial discovery. While one may employ all the methods 
of discovery against parties,2 discovery methods for nonparties are 
much more limited.3 For example, with the exception of the in-
dependent action under subdivision (c), the procedures detailed in 
Federal Rule 34 regarding production of tangible things do not ap-
ply to nonparties.4 Frequently, though, a litigant must discover tan-
gible things in the possession, custody, or control of a nonparty.5 
Although the federal rules do provide alternative methods for the 
discovery of nonparties' things, the whole discovery scheme for non-
parties is rather clumsy. 
First, in terms of the procedure for production, the rules have 
the effect of distinguishing mobile from immobile property.6 If the 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A., University of Wisconsin, 
1974; J.D., University of Kentucky, 1978. 
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37. 
2 Methods available against parties include depositions, FED. R. CIV. P. 27, 30, 31; in-
terrogatories, FED. R. CIV. P. 33; requests for production and inspection, FED. R. CIV. P. 34; 
motions for physical and mental examinations, FED. R. CIV. P. 35; and requests for admis-
sions, FED. R. CIV. P. 36. 
3 Discovery procedures available against nonparties include depositions, FED. R. CIV. P. 
27, 30, 31; independent actions for production and inspection, FED. R. CIV. P. 34(c); and 
subpoenas duces tecum, FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(I). 
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) states that "[a)ny party may serve on any other party a request." 
(emphasis added). 
5 Su, It.g., Huynh v. Werke, 90 F.R.D. 447 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (industrial molding 
machine in nonparty's factory); Santa Fe Int'l Corp. v. Potashnick, 83 F.R.D. 299 (E.D. La. 
1979) (pipe on nonparty's barge); Humphries v. Pennsylvania R.R., 14 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. 
Ohio 1953) (accident site owned by nonparty); Arcell v. Ashland Chern. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 
471,378 A.2d 53 (1977) (poisonous fumes and vapors at nonparty's manufacturing plant); Sltlt 
a/so PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, NEW FEDERAL CIVIL DISCOVERY RULES SOURCEBOOK 
128-29 (Litigation Sourcebook No.4, W. Treadwell ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as DIscov-
ERY SOURCEBOOK). 
6 Throughout this article, the term "immobile" refers to anything which cannot be 
transported to a deposition. This includes things which are literally immobile, for example, 
real estate and fixtures, as well as things which are immobile as a practical matter, for exam-
ple, a herd of cattle or a barge. 
Inspection of such immobile things necessarily entails entry upon another person's prop-
110 
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property is mobile, a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 45(d) is the 
only available discovery method. If the property is immobile, it is 
discoverable only by independent action pursuant to Rule 34(c). 
This inadvertent distinction in procedure serves no policy. More-
over, each of the individual methods has drawbacks. The subpoena 
duces tecum is dependent upon a deposition, which is unnecessary 
and wasteful. The independent action is an obscure, historical dis-
covery device which presents problems of jurisdiction and practical 
utility, and contravenes policies of the federal rules. 
This article examines the federal approach to discovery of non-
parties' tangible things; beginning with an examination of proce-
dures for the production of mobile things. After concluding that the 
subpoena duces tecum is the only available method, the article dis-
cusses the central weakness of the subpoena duces tecum: its depen-
dence on a deposition. Comparable state practice is then explored 
and state alternatives to the subpoena duces tecum are analyzed. 
This article further examines the federal rules' approach to inspec-
tion of immobile things. After a brief history of Rule 34 (c) , in-
dependent actions and their weaknesses are considered. Again, 
comparable state practice is examined for possible alternatives to the 
independent action. Ultimately, this article suggests that amend-
ment of either Rule 34 or Rule 45 would eliminate the weaknesses in 
the federal rules' approach to discovery of nonparties' things, and 
that amendment of Rule 34 is the marginally preferable solution. 
II. Mobile Things 
A. Current Practice Under the Federal Rules 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 does not provide for produc-
tion of nonpar ties' things,7 as the terms of the rule limit it to parties.s 
erty, and throughout this article the phrases inspection of immobile things and entry upon 
land are used interchangeably to denote the same concept. . 
7 Throughout this article, the term "thing" is used in accord with its plain meaning and 
so includes documents within its definition. 
8 FED. R. ClV. P. 34(a) provides in relevant part: "Any party may serve on aT!)" other par~ 
a request (1) to produce and permit the party making the request ... to inspect and copy, 
any designated documents ... , or to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible things 
... ; or (2) to permit entry upon designated land .... " (emphasis added). 
The language of the rule is clear enough and courts have had no trouble concluding that 
Rule 34 applies only to parties. See, e.g. , Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 504 (1946) ("Rule 
34, like Rule 33, is limited to parties to the proceeding .... "); United States v. 25.02 Acres 
of Land, 495 F.2d 1398, 1403 (10th Cir. 1974); Hilgenberg v. Neth, 93 F.R.D. 325, 326 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1981); Home Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Rome, 89 F.R.D. 485, 487 (N.D. Ga. 1980); 
Fleming v. Gardner, 84 F.R.D. 217 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Haafv. Grams, 355 F. Supp. 542 (D. 
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To get production from nonparties, a litigant must use a subpoena
duces tecum pursuant to Rule 45(d)(1). 9 Following this procedure, a
party arranges to depose the nonparty under Rule 30.10 Rule 30(a)
provides that the attendance of witnesses at a deposition may be
compelled by subpoena under Rule 45.11 Rule 45(d) describes how
to obtain a subpoena 12 and further states that the subpoena "may
command the person to whom it is directed to produce and permit
inspection . . .of designated books, papers, documents, or tangible
things."' 13 Under this procedure, then, a litigant subpoenas the non-
Minn. 1973); Continental Coatings Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 382, 384 (N.D. Ill. 1970);
Jobson v. Henne, 35 F.R.D. 37 (W.D.N.Y. 1964); Seven-Up Co. v. Get Up Corp., 30 F.R.D.
550, 551 (N.D. Ohio 1962); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee note ("Rule 34 as
revised continues to apply only to parties.").
It is usually easily discernable who the parties are because their names must be listed in
the summons and complaint. FED. R. Ci'. P. 4(b) ("The summons shall . ..contain the
names of the parties .... "); FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a) ("In the complaint the title of the action
shall include the names of all the parties .... "). Sometimes, however, courts have been
willing to rely on other factors to determine who is a party and therefore subject to Rule 34
Requests for Production. See, e.g., Conversion Chem. Corp. v. Dr.-ing Max Schloetter Fabrik
Fuer Galvanotechnik, 49 F.R.D. 126 (D. Conn. 1969) (garnishee is a party for purpose of
Rule 34); Standard Ins. Co. of New York v. Pittsburgh Elec. Insulation, Inc., 29 F.R.D. 185
(W.D. Pa. 1961) (wholly-owned subsidiary is a party for purpose of Rule 34). See generally 4A
J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & D. EPSTEIN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 33.06 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE].
9 Fisher v. Marubeni Cotton Corp., 526 F.2d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1975); Jones v. Conti-
nental Casualty Co., 512 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (E.D. Va. 1981).
10 The procedure for arranging a deposition is described in FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1) (the
litigant must set a time and place for the deposition and then send a written notice of the
deposition to all other parties to the action).
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a) states in part: "The attendance of witnesses may be compelled
by subpoena as provided in Rule 45."
Note that this rule states a Rule 45 subpoena for a deposition may be served on any
witness, which means that subpoenas for depositions are not limited to nonparties but may be
used to compel the attendance of parties as well. See, e.g., Continental Coatings Corp. v.
Metco, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288
F. Supp. 708, 717 (E.D. Pa. 1968); cf. DISCOVERY SOURcEBOOK, supra note 5, at 123 (Rule
45 is "clearly intended to be exclusively a non-party device. It is not intended that it shall be
an alternative method of getting at parties.").
12 To obtain a subpoena, a litigant must file with the clerk in the district where the
deposition is to be taken a copy of the notice of the deposition and a certificate of service of
the notice. The clerk is then authorized to issue subpoenas for the persons named or de-
scribed in the notice. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1).
13 FED. R. Cv. P. 45(d)(1) provides in part:
The subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to produce and
permit inspection and copying of designated books, papers, documents, or tangible
things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of the examination per-
mitted by Rule 26(b), but in that event the subpoena will be subject to the provi-
sions of R, le 26(c) and subdivision (b) of this rule.
If the subpoena includes a command to bring designated things, it is referred to as a subpoena
duces tecum. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1).
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party for a deposition and requires the nonparty to bring designated
things to the deposition.
Although the procedures of Rule 34 do not generally apply to
nonparties, one part of that rule is relevant to nonparties; subdivision
(c) states that Rule 34 does not preclude independent actions against
nonparties for production of documents and things and permission to
enter upon land.14 This language clearly seems to contemplate in-
dependent actions for production of documents, yet the only court to
decide the issue has held that an independent action may not be used
for discovery of documents due to the availability of subpoenas duces
tecum under Rule 45(d).
In Home Insurance Co. v. First National Bank of Rome, 15 the defend-
ant in the underlying litigation filed an independent action under
Rule 34(c) against a nonparty bank seeking production of notes, pay-
ment records, correspondence and memoranda. The court dismissed
the independent action on the basis that Rule 34(c) was-
designed to cover situations in which a party desires to enter on
land that is not in the possession or control of a party or to inspect
things that it is physically impossible to produce at the taking of a
deposition, for example, a mine that is the site of a cave-in, or a
large machine that is the source of an injury. 16
Since the plaintiff in the discovery action was only seeking the pro-
duction of documents, and the documents were physically suscepti-
ble to production at a deposition, the subpoena duces tecum was the
proper method of discovery.
Home Insurance is the only decision which has specifically ad-
dressed the availability of an independent action under Rule 34(c)
when the things to be discovered are mobile and therefore discovera-
ble with a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 45(d). 17 However,
other courts have implied that they would reach the same result, 18
14 FED. R. Civ. P. 34(c) provides: "This rule does not preclude an independent action
against a person not a party for production of documents and things and permission to enter
upon land." This rule is discussed in detail in notes 88-99 infra and accompanying text.
15 89 F.R.D. 485, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
16 Id at 486.
17 Although the Home Insurance case dealt specifically with documents, the rationale for
the decision makes clear that the holding would extend to all mobile things.
18 See Stebbins v. EEOC, 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 7930, at 6453 (D.D.C. 1972) (com-
plaint filed under Rule 34(c) dismissed in part because availability of information through
Rules 30 and 45 precluded necessity of resort to Rule 34(c) independent action); see also
Fisher v. Marubeni Cotton Corp., 526 F.2d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1975) ("If the person is a
non-party, production of documents can be compelled only by a subpoena duces tecum issued
under Rule 45(d)(1).); Jones v. Continental Casualty Co., 512 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (E.D. Va.
1981); Ghandi v. Police Dep't of Detroit, 74 F.R.D. 115, 118 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1977) ("A party
[Vol. 59:110]
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and the conclusion that Rule 34(c) independent actions cannot be
used to discover mobile things because of the availability of Rule
45(d) subpoenas duces tecum is sound. From the courts' perspective,
subpoenas duces tecum are better than independent actions because
they consume fewer judicial resources.' 9 The number of available
preliminary procedural challenges to a subpoena duces tecum are
few compared to those possible for independent actions. Generally, a
witness who receives a subpoena duces tecum may only challenge it
on the limited procedural grounds that the subpoena was improperly
issued or served. 20 In contrast, a witness who has been named a de-
fendant in an independent action may not only argue that process
was improperly issued or served, but also may raise other objections,
including lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,2' improper
venue, and failure of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.22 Thus, before the court ever reaches the merits of
the discovering party's right to production,23 the use of an independ-
ent action might confront the court with an array of preliminary is-
can compel a non-party to produce books, papers, documents or tangible things only by sub-
poena duces tecum issued pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure").
19 See Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 F. 135, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (where
subpoena duces tecum provides discovery, "principle of judicial parsimony" indicates that
equitable bill of discovery will not lie).
20 Service is described in FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c); issuance is described in FED. R. Civ. P.
45(d). See, e.g., Harrison v. Prather, 404 F.2d 267, 273 (5th Cir. 1968) (service of subpoena
held a nullity because served on plaintiffs counsel instead of plaintiff); Sykes Int'l, Ltd. v.
Pilch's Poultry Breading Farms, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 138, 139 (D. Conn. 1972) (subpoena held
void because served outside territorial limits of Rule 45(d)(2)).
21 See Home Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Rome, 89 F.R.D. 485, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
(independent action for discovery under Rule 34(c) dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction over the
subject matter); see also notes 142-46 inf/a and accompanying text.
22 4A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 8, [ 34.22, at 34-79 n.1 ("[T]o the extent
independent actions for discovery are permissible under the Rules, they would be governed
by the Rules insofar as procedure is concerned."), cited with approval rn Home Ins. Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank of Rome, 89 F.R.D. 485, 487 (N.D. Ga. 1980). Thus, all the objections provided
in FED. R. Civ. P. 12 would be available.
23 Of course, a subpoena may also be challenged as calling for a production that is op-
pressive, burdensome, or unreasonable. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b); Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Texaco, Inc., 517 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1975), reh'g en bane, 555 F.2d 137, cert. denied, 431 U.S.
974 (1977); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. City of Burlington, 351 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 997 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964
(1965); In re Electric Weld Steel Tubing Antitrust Litig., 512 F. Supp. 81 (N.D. Ill. 1981);
Ghandi v. Police Dep't of Detroit, 74 F.R.D. 115, 123-24 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Hecht v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 605 (D.D.C. 1969). And a subpoena may be challenged as calling
for privileged or confidential information, see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b); In re Fish & Neave, 519
F.2d 116 (8th Cir. 1975); Covey OilCo., 340 F.2d at 997; Ghandi, 74 F.R.D. at 123-24; Nader v.
Butz, 60 F.R.D. 381 (D.D.C. 1973). These objections, however, are directed to the substance
of the discovery, and they would be available as challenges to either the subpoena duces
tecum or independent action method of production.
[19831114
DISCOVERY
sues which it presumably resolved in the primary litigation, and must
now resolve again in ancillary litigation.24 Since the scope of discov-
ery is the same for the independent action and the subpoena duces
tecum,25 the independent action is simply a more cumbersome and
less precise discovery method. An independent action achieves the
same result as a subpoena duces tecum while consuming more of the
courts' time in resolving unnecessary questions. Therefore, from a
policy perspective, it is not unreasonable to limit litigants to one
method, the subpoena duces tecum.
The conclusion that Rule 34(c) independent actions cannot be
used for production of mobile things should not distress parties seek-
ing discovery, since, for several reasons, the subpoena duces tecum
provides a more attractive method of production than an independ-
ent action. First, the subpoena duces tecum procedure is simpler than
filing another, separate action against a new defendant. Filing a new
action requires the resolution of many preliminary questions26 and
the drafting of a valid complaint. In contrast, a subpoena duces te-
cum merely involves arranging a deposition, obtaining a subpoena
form from the clerk, filling it in, and serving it on the deponent. 27
Second, a subpoena duces tecum is generally less expensive than an
independent action for a party seeking discovery. The cost of service
for a subpoena and for a summons and complaint is similar,28 but the
witness fees that accompany a subpoena will usually be less than the
filing fees required for an independent action.29 Furthermore, the
subpoena approach is less costly than an independent action in terms
of the time the discovering attorney must spend.30 Finally, the sub-
24 Of course, if fewer questions are presented to the trial court, there are also fewer op-
portunities to burden the appellate courts. See Note, Dvelopments in the Law--Discovery, 74
HARV. L. REV. 940, 992-1000 (1961), regarding the appealability of discovery orders.
25 Independent actions would be governed by the federal rules, see note 22 supra, so the
scope of discovery for both subpoenas duces tecum and independent actions would be gov-
erned by FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
26 For example, the person filing the suit must determine how to obtain jurisdiction over
the subject matter, jurisdiction over the person, and venue.
27 See notes 9-13 supra and accompanying text for a detailed description.
28 Due to an amendment of FED. R. Civ. P. 4, a subpoena and a summons and com-
plaint are now subject to similar service requirements: they may both be served by any per-
son who is not a party and who is at least 18 years old. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c), 45(c).
29 A subpoena must be accompanied by "the fees for one day's attendance and the mile-
age allowed by law." FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c). Currently, these fees amount to $30 per day and
S.20 per mile. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) (Supp. V 1981). The mileage will be limited by the terri-
torial limits for deposition subpoenas in FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2). The filing fee for an in-
dependent action is $60. Therefore, unless the subpoena duces tecum production lasts two
days, an independent action will generally be more expensive.
30 The procedure for obtaining a subpoena is described in notes 9-13 supra and accompa-
[Val. 59:110]
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poena duces tecum offers a more certain and reliable method of
achieving production. As discussed above, an independent action al-
lows the defendant to make a battery of preliminary challenges, an
opportunity which does not arise with a subpoena duces tecum.
Moreover, Rule 45(d) subpoenas duces tecum are relatively well-de-
fined by the courts compared to Rule 34(c) actions, which have at-
tracted only slight judicial attention.31 Generally an attorney who
merely wants an expeditious production would not opt for a seldom
used procedure which entails complex preliminary issues.32
For the nonparty, the subpoena duces tecum is also preferable to
an independent action. While a nonparty who is served with a sub-
poena duces tecum and decides to resist the production would proba-
bly have to consult a lawyer to avoid the possibility of a contempt
citation,33 if the witness decides to comply with the subpoena,
nying text. Once this procedure is followed, the discovering attorney receives a standard form
subpoena, which he must then arrange to have served on the deponent. This is a fairly quick
process. In contrast, an attorney planning to use an independent action cannot merely get a
form from the clerk but must draft a complaint and arrange for its service. The time saved in
procuring a form as opposed to drafting a complaint would result in a less expensive
production.
31 Only one reported federal decision construes Rule 34(c), Home Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank of Rome, 89 F.R.D. 485 (N.D. Ga. 1980). Other courts have referred to Rule 34(c) but
without meaningful discussion. See United States v. 25.02 Acres of Land, 495 F.2d 1398, 1402
(10th Cir. 1974); Stebbins v. EEOC, 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 7930, at 6453 (D.D.C.
1972).
In addition, one state court has construed an identical state version of Rule 34(c). See
Beckwith v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 182 NJ. Super. 376, 440 A.2d 1372 (1981); Arcell v.
Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 378 A.2d 53 (1977).
32 Indeed, assuming Rule 34(c) actions were available for mobile things, it is unclear as a
practical matter why a party seeking production would ever choose that method over a sub-
poena duces tecum. In Home Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Rome, 89 F.R.D. 485 (N.D. Ga.
1980), the court seemed puzzled by and impatient with the plaintiffs attempt to use an in-
dependent action. The court stated:
The discovery rules clearly provide an adequate remedy to the plaintiff in this
case. . . Defendant has stated that it has no objections to being subpoenaed and
to producing the documents which are sought by the plaintiff, ifsuch production is
done in such a manner as to protect the defendant in its relationship with its bank-
ing customers. As the plaintiff in this action has the right of subpoena and the
bank, subject to the propriety of the subpoena, would have to respond and has no
objection to so responding, it appears to this Court that this matter could and
should be properly handled by a subpoena duces tecum entered in the case which is
already in progress.
Id at 488.
33 To object to the subpoena, the nonparty is required to serve written objections on the
subpoenaing attorney within a certain time period. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). If the nonparty
is not familiar with this rule, he might decide to contest the subpoena by merely not comply-
ing instead of serving written objections. In that case, the nonparty might be liable for con-
tempt under FED. R. Civ. P. 45(f.
[19831
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he 34 can easily do so without the aid of an attorney.35 In contrast,
where the nonparty becomes the defendant in an independent ac-
tion, the nonparty would most likely have to hire an attorney regard-
less of whether he opposed the production.3 6
The Home Insurance court clearly reached the better result in
deeming Rule 34(c) independent actions unavailable for discovery of
mobile things. Yet this holding seems plainly inconsistent with the
language of Rule 34(c), which refers to independent actions in re-
gards to production of "documents and things and permission to
enter upon land." The rule makes no distinction based on the mobil-
ity of the discovered items. Indeed, the reference in Rule 34(c) to
"documents," 37 which are invariably mobile, indicates that the rule
specifically contemplates independent actions for mobile objects.
In justifying the Home Insurance decision, the court ignored this
language and focused instead on the purpose of Rule 34(c), which
the Advisory Committee Notes revealed.38 But a better rationale for
this holding, more consistent with the language of the rule, focuses on
the limiting impact of the first two words of Rule 34(c). Rule 34(c)
states: "This rule does not preclude an independent action .... "
Clearly, "this rule" refers to Rule 34. While Rule 34 does not pre-
clude an independent action, a court could find that Rule 45 does.
Of course, Rule 45 would preclude independent actions only to the
extent that it operates; and since Rule 45(d) concerns only mobile
34 For simplicity, the term "he" shall be used throughout the article as a non-gender-
based reference.
35 The subpoena informs the deponent exactly where to appear, what time to appear,
and what materials to bring.
36 Of course, if the person from whom production is sought seeks to obstruct the produc-
tion, the subpoena duces tecum has the disadvantage of depriving him of the opportunity to
interpose a multitude of time consuming preliminary objections before the court reaches the
substantive question of whether the production is warranted. Since the only advantage of an
independent action over a subpoena duces tecum benefits the unscrupulous witness, it is not a
characteristic warranting preservation.
37 The term "documents" is defined in FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) to include "writings, draw-
ings, graphs, charts, photographs, phono-records, and other data compilations from which
information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent through detection
devices into reasonably usable form."
38 89 F.R.D. at 486 ("It is clear from the text of the Advisory Committee Note that
subdivision (c) was added to the Federal Rules to fill a specific void in the Rules. That is, it
was designed to cover situations in which a party desires to enter on land that is not in the
possession or control of a party or to inspect things that it is physically impossible to produce
at the taking of a deposition, for example, a mine that is the site of a cave-in, or a large
machine that is the source of an injury.") (citations omitted); see also id. at 488 (case is inap-
propriate for application of Rule 34(c) because it is "plainly not one which that Rule was
originally intended to cover.').
[Vol. 59:110]
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things, it would only preclude independent actions for mobile
things.39
From the courts' perspective, the Home Insurance holding serves
the policy of judicial economy. For the lititigants seeking discovery,
the unavailability of independent actions for production of mobile
things presents no burden since the subpoena duces tecum method is
simpler, less expensive, and more certain to produce results than an
independent action. For the nonparty, the role of deponent is gener-
ally less expensive than that of defendant. Nevertheless, although the
subpoena duces tecum is therefore the best and indeed the only way
to compel the production of mobile things from a nonparty, one ma-
jor drawback limits its efficacy: the subpoena duces tecum is depen-
dent on a deposition.
B. Weaknesses in the Federal Practice
As previously mentioned,4° under the subpoena duces tecum
procedure for discovery of tangible things, a litigant must subpoena
the nonparty4' for a deposition and require him to bring designated
things. Rule 45(d) subpoenas duces tecum can only compel produc-
tion of things in connection with a deposition; without a deposition,
Rule 45(d) does not apply, and production cannot be required. 42
This deposition prerequisite has several drawbacks. Where the
party seeking discovery only wants access to the things and does not
need to depose anyone about them, a deposition wastes the time of
everyone involved. The attorney seeking production must attend the
deposition to get access to the things subpoenaed even if he has no
39 Where the discovery rules provide an adequate remedy, they occupy the field, and
independent relief is not available. See Home Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Rome, 89 F.R.D.
485, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1980) and cases cited therein. For a detailed discussion of preemption, see
note 97 infra.
40 See text accompanying notes 8-13 supra.
41 The nonparty selected as the deponent need not be the owner of the things but must at
least have custody or control over the things for the subpoena to be effective. See Ghandi v.
Police Dep't of Detroit, 74 F.R.D. 115, 122-23 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Mattie T. Johnston, 74
F.R.D. 498, 502 (N.D. Miss. 1976); United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 71
F.R.D. 88, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("[A] subpoena is enforceable only as to documents within the
possession, custody or control of the subpoenaed person."); Beegle v. Thomson, 2 F.R.D. 82,
83 (N.D. Ill. 1941).
42 Ghandi v. Police Dep't of Detroit, 74 F.R.D. 115, 118 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1977); United
States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 71 F.R.D. 88, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)("[Rule 45]
addresses subpoenas duces tecum in connection with depositions and neither authorizes nor
addresses subpoenas duces tecum which are unconnected to a deposition proceeding. . .. 'I;
McLean v. Prudential S.S. Co., 36 F.R.D. 421, 426 (E.D. Va. 1965); McDowell Assoc., Inc. v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 20 F.R.D 219, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Newmark v. Abeel, 106 F. Supp. 758,
759 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Beegle v. Thomson, 2 F.R.D. 82, 83 (N.D. Ill. 1941).
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questions. As a practical matter, the attorneys for the other parties
would also be required to attend the deposition, not to obtain access
to the subpoenaed things,43 but to protect their clients' interests in
the event that some questions were asked.44 For all the attorneys in-
volved, the inconvenience is aggravated if they have to travel out of
town to attend the deposition.45 Finally, the subpoenaed nonparty
should not have to attend a deposition if the discovering attorney
merely wants to inspect or copy things.46
The deposition requirement also wastes money. The additional
time the discovering party's attorney must spend to attend a deposi-
tion significantly increases the cost of production.4 7 Moreover, if the
deposition requires the attorneys to travel, 48 the client must bear the
cost for yet more of the attorney's time and the travel expenses.49
43 FED. R. Civ. P. 30(l) provides in relevant part:
Documents and things produced for inspection during the examination of the
witness, shall, upon the request of a party, be marked for identification and an-
nexed to and returned with the deposition, and may be inspected and copied by
any party....
(2) Upon payment of reasonable charges therefor, the official shall furnish a copy
of the deposition to any party or to the deponent.
44 A discovering attorney, even assuming he were inclined to do so, would not be able to
predict with certainty whether he would have any questions for the deponent. Even if the
attorney originally anticipates none, some questions might arise after his first contact with the
subpoenaed thing. Furthermore, a discovering attorney who arrives at a deposition to find
that none of the other parties' attorneys are attending might take advantage of this situation
and manipulate the deponent (who as a nonparty may have no attorney and no interest to
protect) to elicit some favorable testimony while there is no danger of objections by the other
parties. Obviously it is risky for a party not to attend any deposition.
45 FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2) provides:
A resident of the district in which the deposition is to be taken may be required to
attend an examination only in the county wherein he resides or is employed or
transacts his business in person, or at such other convenient place as is fixed by an
order of court. A nonresident of the district may be required to attend only in the
county wherein he is served with a subpoena, or within 40 miles from the place of
service, or at such other convenient place as is fixed by an order of court.
This rule requires the litigants to travel to the nonparty's place of residence or business if
they want to depose him.
46 Of course, the nonparty can offer to produce the things without appearing at a deposi-
tion; and if the discovering attorney agrees, everything is fine. Indeed, if all litigation partici-
pants were agreeable and reasonable, all lawsuits would be settled. The real issue is what a
party can force a nonparty to do. Currently, a party can force the nonparty to appear at a
deposition even if the party has no questions and the nonparty offers to produce the things
without a deposition.
47 As noted above, the discovering attorney will always have to attend and the other
attorneys will have to attend, as a practical matter. .et note 44supra and accompanying text.
48 See note 45 supra.
49 In addition to paying for his attorneys' time and travel, the client must also pay fees to
the nonparty deponent. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c) provides in relevant part that "[s]ervice of a
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Finally, a deposition requires physical arrangements not implicated
by a document production: a room for the deposition, 50 an officer,5'
and facilities for recording the deposition.52 Depositions are quite
expensive. 53
Although an attorney might not need to ask questions regarding
the subpoenaed things, more frequently the attorney does have some
questions for the deponent. 54 Even if the attorney has questions for
the deponent, however, the deposition prerequisite to production is
disadvantageous in several respects. The chief problem concerns
preparation. The attorney needs time to review the things to prepare
effective questions for the deposition, but preparation is impossible
when the attorney's first exposure to the things is at the deposition
itself.55
Under the current rules, the attorney who needs time to review
the documents or things has three options, none of which satisfacto-
rily solves the problem. If the response to the subpoena duces tecum
encompasses relatively few documents, the attorney can arrange for
the deponent and the other attorneys to wait in the deposition room
or take a recess while he reviews the documents. This delay wastes
the time of the deponent and other attorneys; moreover, if the attor-
subpoena upon a person ...shall be made by delivering a copy thereof to such person and
by tendering to him the fees for one day's attendance and the mileage allowed by law." See
note 29 supra (discussing the fee requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (b) (Supp. V 1981)).
50 If the deposition can be scheduled at the discovering attorney's office, a conference
room might be available at no additional cost. If the deposition has to be scheduled away
from the discovering attorney's office, however, it might be necessary to rent a room. Loca-
tions for the deposition are governed by Rule 45(d)(2). See note 45 supra.
51 FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c) requires that the officer before whom the deposition is to be
taken swear in the witness and record his testimony. After the deposition is taken, FED. R.
Civ. P. 30() requires that the officer certify, seal, and file the deposition.
52 FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c) provides that "[tihe testimony shall be taken stenographically or
recorded by any other means ordered in accordance with subdivision (b)(4) of this rule."
Subdivision (b)(4) provides that testimony may be recorded by "other than stenographic
means." The other means typically include tape recording or videotaping. Regardless of
whether the recording is done by a stenographer, a tape recorder, or a videotape machine, it
costs money to make.
53 See Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discover
, 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure , 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 820 (1981) (describing depositions as a relatively costly
way to obtain information).
54 As noted above, these questions may be anticipated or raised by the attorney's first
contact with the thing. See note 44 supra.
55 Again, if the deponent is cooperative and eager to produce the things for the discover-
ing attorney in advance of the deposition, the problem is avoided.
The problem of adequate preparation for the deposition does not arise when the depo-
nent is a party since the litigants may use a Rule 34 Request for Production sufficiently in
advance of the deposition to allow review of the documents and things before the deposition.
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ney ultimately has no questions for the deponent, the entire gather-
ing was unnecessary.
If the response to the subpoena duces tecum includes such a sub-
stantial number of documents or things that one attorney cannot rea-
sonably ask the deponent and other attorneys to wait while they are
reviewed,56 the discovering attorney might bring associates to the
deposition to assist with the document review. While one attorney is
examining the opponent or one group of documents, the other attor-
neys could be reviewing the other documents for possible questions.5 7
This approach is haphazard, since the attorneys reviewing docu-
ments will not hear the deponent's testimony and thus might miss
areas of interest in the documents. Also, delay is inevitable while the
first documents are being reviewed, and if the discovering attorneys
decide they have no questions, again the whole procedure becomes
wasteful.
Lastly, the discovering attorney may continue the deposition at
a later date. This is the only feasible alternative where the produc-
tion is voluminous or complex. 58 A continuation is the most desira-
ble approach for the attorney seeking production, for it fosters the
most unhurried and thorough preparation. But a continuation
presents difficulties as well. The deposing attorney must risk the
court precluding a continuation,5 9 and the necessity of a continua-
56 See DISCOVERY SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 122 ("By and large, if you want a
goodly number of documents, you do not want to be presented with them at the deposition
anyhow. You want to read them beforehand, so that everybody is not falling asleep during
the deposition while the one side is examining the documents.").
57 Usually the subpoenaing attorney has some idea of how voluminous the response to
the subpoena will be and can plan accordingly the number of associates to take the deposi-
tion. If the response is more voluminous than anticipated, however, the attorney may appear
at the deposition alone and be unable to recruit help from his office. This will certainly be a
problem if the deposition is being taken out of town.
The attorneys reviewing documents can either run into the deposition when they find an
interesting document or thing and deliver it to the examining attorney, or they can take turns
examining the deponent on documents they have reviewed. Either approach is disruptive
and likely to produce a disjointed transcript.
58 Large or complex responses to subpoenas duces tecum are not unusual. See, e.g.,
Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 997 (10th Cir. 1965) (subpoena required
production of documents showing for the state of Utah during a designated period: (1) ac-
tual purchase price of all gasoline purchased; (2) actual sales price of all gasoline sold other
than at retail; (3) volume of gasoline sold each month segregated by city with separate figures
for regular and premium; and (4) number and location of service stations owned, operated,
and leased by the nonparty deponent); Banana Distrib., Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 19 F.R.D.
532, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (subpoena required production of all documents which recorded the
quality, purchaser, and price for all shiploads of bananas entering New England, the Middle
Atlantic States, portions of the Midwest and South, and Eastern Canada from 1946 to 1953).
59 The second sentence of FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a) indicates that generally leave of court
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tion augments the waste of time and money.
None of these alternatives is satisfactory. It is crucial that the
discovering attorney have time to examine the things and prepare
questions for the deposition, because without adequate preparation,
production of the things may be fruitless, 60 or at least of less value.6'
Recognizing these impediments in the federal system, several states
have taken steps to improve their own production procedures.
C. Current State Practice
Although most states have adopted the federal rules' system of
deposition and subpoena duces tecum for the production of mobile
things,62 several states attempting to improve this procedure have va-
ried their rules to eliminate the deposition prerequisite. 63 States have
basically taken two approaches. The first allows parties to serve
Rule 45(d) subpoenas for the production of things alone, without a
deposition. 64 The second approach permits Rule 34 requests for pro-
need not be obtained for a deposition. This provision has been interpreted to eliminate all
technical objections to a second deposition of the same person. See 4 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 26.50 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as 4 MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE]. However, when the second deposition is "purely repetitious," the court
may enter a protective order precluding the deposition. Id. at n.25; see Church of Scientology
v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1981) (no abuse of discretion by district court in preclud-
ing second deposition when there were no new issues of material fact). Where the second
deposition is necessary so that documents produced at the first deposition may be analyzed
before the deponent is questioned, the second deposition will usually not be purely repetitious
and should not be precluded by the court. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp.-Urananium
Contracts Litig., 570 F.2d 899, 902 (10th Cir. 1978) (abuse of discretion for district court to
preclude third deposition where party had had no opportunity to question deponent on re-
cently produced documents). While the risk that a second deposition would be precluded is
minimal, it is nonetheless a risk.
60 For example, a business record is often unintelligible unless explained by someone
familiar with it. Documents of this type rarely speak for themselves.
61 Even assuming the content of a document is self-explanatory, the document's value
may decrease if the deponent cannot be questioned on it. Suppose in response to a subpoena
duces tecum, a party receives a document that he wishes to introduce into evidence at trial.
However, the records custodian is beyond the reach of subpoena under Rule 45(e). The party
wishing to introduce the document must establish the document as a business record at the
deposition or be precluded from introducing it into evidence. In this situation, the opportu-
nity to examine the deponent on the document is crucial to the value of the document.
62 See,e.g., KY. R. Civ. P. 45; TENN. R. Civ. P. 45; Utah R. Civ. P.45; Wyo. R. Civ. P.
45.
63 See ALA. R. Civ. P. 34; FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.351; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-34 (1982); IND.
R. TRIAL P. 34(c); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3210(c) (West Supp. 1982); TEX. R. Civ. P.
167(4).
64 See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.351, 30 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.351 (West Supp. 1983), discussed in
notes 66-85 infra and accompanying text.
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duction to be directed to nonparties as well as parties. 65 The first
approach, which allows Rule 45(d) subpoenas to compel production
of things independent of a deposition, was recently adopted by one
state.
Rule 1.351 of the Florida Civil Rules of Procedure became effec-
tive in 1981.66 The rule, entitled "Production of Documents and
Things Without Deposition," provides that a party may seek inspec-
tion and copying of any documents or things within the scope of dis-
covery from a nonparty by issuing a subpoena directing the
production. 67 Under this rule, the discovering party serves the other
parties with a notice of intent to issue a subpoena and a copy of the
proposed subpoena at least ten days before issuance. 68 If, during the
ten-day waiting period, any party objects to production under Rule
1.351, the discovering party must pursue the production under the
traditional deposition and subpoena duces tecum procedure. 69 But if
there are no objections, the subpoena is issued.70
The subpoena must inform the nonparty that he has the right to
65 See ALA. R. CV. P. 34; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-34 (1982); IND. R. TRIAL P. 34(c);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3210(c) (West Supp. 1982); TEx. R. CIv. P. 167(4). This second
approach provides access to immobile as well as mobile things. See also text accompanying
notes 153-208 infra.
66 30 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.351 (West Supp. 1983); Florida Bar, In re Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 391 So. 2d 165, 171 (Fla. 1980).
67 FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.351 provides:
(a) Request: Scope. A party may seek inspection and copying of any docu-
ments or things within the scope of Rule 1.350(a) from a person who is not a party
by issuance of a subpoena directing the production of the documents or things
when the requesting party does not seek to depose the custodian or other person in
possession of the documents or things.
68 FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.351(b) provides:
(b) Procedure. A party desiring production under this rule shall give notice to
every other party of the intent to serve a subpoena under this rule at least ten days
before the subpoena is issued. The proposed subpoena shall be attached to the
notice ....
69 FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.351(b) states:
If any party serves an objection to production under this rule within 10 days of
service of the notice or the person upon whom the subpoena is to be served objects
at any time before the production of the documents or things, the documents or
things shall not be produced under this rule.
The Committee Note to the rule states that if there is an objection, "recourse must be
had to Rule 1.3 10." Florida Rule 1.3 10, "Depositions Upon Oral Examination," is similar to
Federal Rule 30; it provides for the traditional subpoena duces tecum method of production.
See also Note, Civil Procedure, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855, 897 (1981) ("The rule prohibits
production, however, if a party objects. The requesting party will have to serve a notice of
deposition and subpoena duces tecum under rule 1.310.")(footnote omitted).
70 FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.351(c)("Ifno objection is made by a party under subdivision (b), the
clerk shall issue a subpoena for the production of the documents or things .... ").
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object to production 7' and is not required to surrender the things. 72
This information concerning his rights may enable the nonparty to
respond without retaining an attorney. 73 Furthermore, one may only
require production in certain counties with which the nonparty or
the things themselves have significant contacts. 74 Alternatively, the
subpoena may give the nonparty the option of producing the things
by mail. 75 These provisions thus offer subpoenaed nonparties protec-
tion from an overly burdensome production.
As currently drafted, however, Rule 1.351 does not clearly indi-
cate whether it allows inspection of immobile things. Subsection (1)
defines the scope of Rule 1.351 by reference to Rule 1.350(a). 76 Simi-
lar to Federal Rule 34(a), Rule 1.350(a) provides for entry upon des-
ignated land or other property. 77 This provision suggests that Rule
71 FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.351(b) states that "[tihe proposed subpoena ... shall state that the
person who will be asked to produce the documents or things has the right to object to the
production under this rule." If the subpoenaed nonparty objects at any time before produc-
tion, the discovering party must proceed by the traditional deposition and subpoena duces
tecum method. See note 69 supra.
72 Generally the duty to produce a thing does not include the duty to surrender the
thing. See State ex rel. Crawford v. Moody, 477 S.W.2d 438, 440 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); Stateex
rel. Emge v. Corcoran, 468 S.W.2d 724, 725-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971):
'Produce' is defined as 'to bring forward: lead forth: offer to view or notice: exhibit:
show', Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged. It is not a syn-
onym of 'turn over' or 'give.' The rule contemplates that the possession, custody
and control shall remain in the party producing, and the moving party shall have
the opportunity to inspect, copy or photograph. The rule does not contemplate
that the moving party shall receive the possession, custody or control of the thing
produced.
73 It was the intent of the drafters to design these subpoenas to maximize the opportunity
of chances that the subpoenaed party respond without having to hire counsel. Telephone
interview with S. Sammy Cacciatore, Jr., Chairman, Rule and Procedures Committee of the
Florida Academy of Trial Lawyers, Inc. (Feb. 8, 1983). On this point, the Florida subpoenas
are preferable to comparable federal subpoenas which make no mention of the right to object.
74 FLA. R. Ci'. P. 1.351 (c) provides: "The subpoena shall require production only in the
county of the residence of the custodian or other person in possession of the documents or
things or in the county where the documents or things are located or where the custodian or
person in possession usually conducts his business." Federal Rule 45 has a similar provision
which controls where a nonparty may be required to appear for a deposition, see FED. R. Civ.
P. 45(d)(2).
75 FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.351 (c) ("The subpoena may give the recipient an option to deliver or
mail legible copies of the documents or things to the party serving the subpoena.").
76 FLA. R. Cw. P. 1.351 (a)("A party may seek inspection and copying of any documents
or things within the scope of Rule 1.350(a) .... ").
77 FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.350(a) states in relevant part: "(a) Request; Scope. Any party may
request any other party (1) to produce. . designated documents...; or (2) to inspect . . .
tangible things...;or (3) topermit entg upon desjgnated land or other property. "(emphasis
added).
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1.351 allows subpoenas for entry upon the property of a nonparty,78
yet other provisions of Rule 1.351 contradict this conclusion. First,
the language of Rule 1.351 refers only to subpoenas for the inspection
and copying of documents and things. Although the inspection of a
thing might arguably allow for entry upon land, when the right to
enter upon the land of a party was established in Rule 1.350, the
drafters used explicit language. 79 Moreover, Rule 1.351 authorizes
subpoenas only for the "production" of documents or things, which
suggests that the rule does not cover immobile property, since it can-
not be "produced" at a designated place.80
Subsection (e) provides another indication that Rule 1.351 does
not allow subpoenas for inspection of immobile things. Subsection
(e) states that "[t]his rule does not affect the right of any party to
bring an independent action for production of documents and things
or permission to enter upon land."' The specific mention of permis-
sion to enter upon land indicates that such entry is not already au-
thorized and demonstrates the drafters' intent to treat production of
things and entry upon land as distinct propositions. 82 Thus, in spite
of some ambiguity regarding the scope of Rule 1.351, the better in-
terpretation is that the rule applies only to mobile things and does
not authorize entry upon land.
The voluntary character of Rule 1.351 is its major weakness. If
any party or the subpoenaed nonparty objects to proceeding under
Rule 1.351, the rule cannot be invoked and the discovering party
must revert to the traditional deposition procedure. 83 Therefore, any
party or nonparty can still force a deposition, although two objec-
tions might now be required: one to proceeding under Rule 1.351,
78 Also, Rule 1.351 refers merely to "Rule 1.350(a)"; the reference is not limited to
1.350(a)(1)(documents) or (a)(2)(tangible things). Thus, the reference to "Rule 1.350(a)"
seems to incorporate (a)(3)(entry upon land).
79 , See note 77 supra.
80 See State ex rel. Crawford v. Moody, 477 S.W.2d 438, 440 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) ("pro-
duce" means to bring forward, lead forth; an order to produce does not authorize the discov-
ering party to go onto property of nonparties).
81 FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.351(e).
82 The Florida Civil Procedure Rules Committee never considered establishing a sub-
poena for entry upon the property of nonparties and clearly did not intend for Rule 1.351 to
be such a provision. Telephone interview with S. Sammy Cacciatore, supra note 73.
83 See note 69 supra. The person objecting to the use of Rule 1.351 need not give any
cause or basis for the objection; the objection alone is sufficient to prohibit use of this rule.
The drafters of the rule intended that no cause for an objection be required so that the rule
could only be invoked for totally noncontroversial productions; if there was any controversy,
any party or the deponent could force a deposition to be taken as part of the production.
Telephone interview with S. Sammy Cacciatore, supra note 73.
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and then one to employing the subpoena duces tecum method if no
deposition were scheduled. This loophole renders the rule meaning-
less since it operates only when all the participants agree to it. In-
deed, under traditional subpoena duces tecum procedure production
can be accomplished without a deposition if everyone agrees. The
paramount issue is not how to accomplish a production most effi-
ciently when everyone cooperates, but rather how to accomplish a
production most efficiently when one or more participants resist.
Rule 1.351 should be amended. Specifically, the provision
which allows any person to object and thereby render the rule inap-
plicable should be deleted. Such an amendment would prejudice no
one. The nonparty would only lose the right to object to the method
of production, a right which should never have been accorded the
nonparty anyway.8 4 The nonparty's rights to object to the substance
of the production would remain unaffected.8 5 And this amendment
would not prejudice the parties because any one of them who, after
examining the things produced, felt that production alone was inade-
quate could subpoena the nonparty for a deposition. With this sug-
gested change, the new Florida rule would effectively eliminate
unnecessary depositions and become an efficient method for discov-
ery of nonparties' mobile things.
84 It is absurd to give a witness who is not a party to the action the right to object to the
method of production selected by the litigants. An analogous situation arises when a non-
party deponent objects to a subpoena on the basis that it calls for the production of irrelevant
things. See Ghandi v. Police Dep't of Detroit, 74 F.R.D. 115, 123 (E.D. Mich. 1977)("[T]he
Court has serious reservations about the propriety of a nonparty deponent moving to quash a
subpoena duces tecum on the ground that the information sought is not relevant to the pend-
ing action. It is not a party to the pending action and generally has no interest in the out-
come.")(footnote and citations omitted); see also Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.,
288 F. Supp. 708, 717 (E.D. Pa. 1968)(relevance and materiality are not appropriate concerns
of nonparty deponents since they have no interest in the outcome of the case); Schutte &
Koerting Co. v. Fischer & Porter Co., 6 Fed. R. Serv. 45b.413, Case 2 (E.D. Pa. 1942)(non-
party witness not entitled to raise question of materiality in response to subpoena). Similarly,
because the nonparty has no interest in the outcome, the method of production selected by
the parties is not a proper topic of concern for the nonparty, and he should not be allowed to
object to it.
85 The nonparty may object to the production on the basis that it is burdensome, oppres-
sive, unreasonable, or would require disclosure of confidential or privileged information. FLA.
R. Civ. P. 1.410(b), 1.280(b); see also Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 997
(10th Cir. 1965); Ghandi v. Police Dep't of Detroit, 74 F.R.D. 115, 123-24 (E.D. Mich. 1977);
and note 23 supra.
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III. Immobile Things
A. Current Practice Under the Federal Rules
As previously discussed, discovery of nonparties' mobile things
in the federal system is achieved through a deposition and subpoena
duces tecum under Rule 45(d).8 6 But immobile things cannot be
produced at a deposition and are therefore beyond the reach of a
subpoena duces tecum.8 7 Access to such immobile things requires en-
try on a nonparty's property,88 and under the federal rules a non-
party cannot be compelled to permit such entry for inspection.8 9
The only available method for compelling a nonparty to allow access
to immobile things is an independent action for discovery pursuant
to Rule 34(c). 90
1. History of Rule 34(c)
Rule 34(c) is relatively new. In 1967, the Advisory Committee
proposed extensive amendments to Rule 34.9 1 As proposed, the rule
made no mention of nonparties, 92 but the Advisory Committee indi-
cated its receptiveness to comments from the bar regarding the need
for a provision concerning entry upon nonparties' land.93 Comment
86 See notes 7-39 supra and accompanying text.
87 See note 6 supra for the definition of immobile.
88 See, e.g., Huynh v. Werke, 90 F.R.D. 447 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (industrial molding
machine in nonparty's factory); Sante Fe Int'l Corp. v. Potashnick, 83 F.R.D. 299 (E.D. La.
1979) (large quantities of pipe located on nonparty's barge); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co.,
152 N.J. Super. 471, 378 A.2d 53 (1977) (poisonous fumes and vapors at nonparty's manufac-
turing plant).
89 Huynh v. Werke, 90 F.R.D. 447, 450 (S.D. Ohio 1981)("The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provide this Court with no authorily to order a nonparty to permit entry upon
land.") (emphasis in original); Sante Fe Int'l Corp. v. Potashnick, 83 F.R.D. 299, 301 (E.D.
La. 1979); Humphries v. Pennsylvania R.R., 14 F.R.D. 177, 181 (N.D. Ohio 1953). In con-
trast, a party may be compelled to permit entry under FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(2) ("Any party
may serve on any other party a request . . . (2) to permit entry upon designated land or
other property . . ").
90 Huynh v. Werke, 90 F.R.D. 447, 450 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co.,
152 NJ. Super. 471, 505, 378 A.2d 53, 70 (1977); see also Note, Rule 34(c) and Discovely of
Nonparty Land, 85 YALE L.J. 112, 114 (1975) ("[T]he availability of such discovery depends
entirely on whatever independent action might be brought.').
91 Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 F.R.D. 211, 255-56 (1967).
92 FED. R. Civ. P. 34(c). ("This rule does not preclude an independent action against a
person not a party for production of documents and things and permission to enter upon
land.").
93 Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 F.R.D. 211, 257 (1967)(Advi-
sory Committee Notes to 1970 revision of Rule 34):
The rule as revised continues to apply only to parties. It has been suggested that
the rule should authorize a court order to nonparties to permit entry on land, in
appropriate cases. The need for this provision is not shown by the reported cases or
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from the bar was received, 94 and subdivision (c) was added to Rule
34 under the Supreme Court's proposed amendments in 1970.95
Subdivision (c) merely states that the rule does not preclude in-
dependent actions against nonparties. The Advisory Committee rec-
ognized that the amendment was not an "ideal solution" but implied
that it would have to suffice for the present time.96
2. Authority for Independent Actions
Rule 34(c) clarifies that the federal rules do not preempt in-
dependent actions for production against nonparties.97 Rule 34(c)
by the commentators, but perhaps it will be shown by reports of difficulties from
the bar.
94 The Committee received "something like half a dozen" comments from the bar. DIs-
COVERY SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 128.
95 48 F.R.D. 459, 526 (1970). One commentator has dubbed subdivision (c) "the pecu-
liar little tag at the end of Rule 34." DISCOVERY SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 125.
96 FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee note, 48 F.R.D. at 487, 527 ("While an ideal
solution to this problem is to provide for discovery against persons not parties in Rule 34,
both the jurisdictional and procedural problems are very complex. For the present, this sub-
division makes clear that Rule 34 does not preclude independent actions for discovery against
persons not parties."). See also DISCOVERY SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 128 (remarks of
Professor and Advisory Committee Reporter Albert Sacks):
So the question arose again. Should we put in an affirmative procedure for
such discovery? Again we ran into all the difficulties. Time was pressing at this
point. Not having a good procedure for affirmative discovery, the solution lay in
saying, well, at least we can eliminate the pre-emptive character of Rule 34, making
it clear that if such a discovery device can be fashioned independently of the rules,
it would not be banned by Rule 34.
The note says very plainly that it would be better to have a different rule. But
there are difficulties involved, and therefore, in the interim, this is being done. This
is a rather candid statement of reasons.
97 FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee notes to subsection (c) state:
Comments from the bar make clear that in the preparation of cases for trial it is
occasionally necessary to enter land or inspect large tangible things in the posses-
sion of a person not a party, and that some courts have dismissed independent
actions in the nature of bills in equity for such discovery on the ground that Rule 34
is preemptive. . . . [T]his subdivision makes clear that Rule 34 does not preclude
independent actions for discovery against persons not parties.
According to the Advisory Committee's Note, some courts had dismissed independent
actions on the basis that the rules were preemptive. See also DISCOVERY SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 5, at 128 (noting reports of other cases where independent actions to enter nonparty land
were held preempted by Rules 34 and 45). Cf. Amand v. Pennsylvania R.R., 17 F.R.D. 290
(D.N.J. 1955)(independent action for discovery in aid of labor arbitration proceeding dis-
missed on the basis of preemption by the federal rules).
At any rate, today, courts deciding whether independent actions for discovery are pre-
empted by the rules generally conclude that the answer depends on whether the rules provide
an adequate remedy for the party seeking discovery. If the rules do not provide adequate
discovery, an independent action will lie. See Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super.
471, 506, 378 A.2d 53, 71 (1977) ("[T]he majority view is that modern rules and statutes
relating to discovery do not abrogate equitable jurisdiction as to bills of discovery, and equity
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does not create an independent action for discovery, 98 nor does it
authorize independent actions. 99 Other sources of authority must be
consulted to determine what constitutes an independent action for
discovery.
The old equitable bill of discovery in aid of an action at law
provides one source of authority for an independent action.10 0 The
equitable bill of discovery was developed to allow some pretrial dis-
may be resorted to where effective discovery cannot be obtained under the rules or statutes.")
(citations omitted) (independent action for entry on nonparty land allowed because rules
provided no discovery); Lutz Eng'g Co., v. Sterling Eng'g & Constr. Co., 314 A.2d 8, 10 n.4
(R.I. 1974) ("The . . . Court still retains the power to entertain a complaint for discovery
. . . where the. . . Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide a plain, adequate and complete
remedy.")(independent action for discovery held not preempted by rules, but disallowed on
other grounds). On the other hand, if the rules do provide an adequate remedy, an independ-
ent action for discovery will be dismissed. See Home Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Rome, 89
F.R.D. 485, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1980)(independent action for discovery of documents dismissed in
part because rules provided adequate remedy in the form of subpoena duces tecum). Thus,
independent actions for discovery of nonparties' immobile things are not preempted by the
rules since the rules provide no remedy in that situation. This analysis is consistent with Rule
34(c).
98 Home Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Rome, 89 F.R.D. 485, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1980); see
also FED. R. Civ. P. 82 ("These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction
of the United States district courts .... ). Seegenerall DISCOVERY SOURcEBOOK,supra note
5, at 126.
99 Home Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Rome, 89 F.R.D. 485, 487 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
("Rule 34(c) states that independent actions are not precluded; however, it contains no lan-
guage authorizing such discovery."); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super 481, 485,
378 A.2d 53, 70 (1977) ("The parties agree that this rule [R. 4:18-1(c), the New Jersey coun-
terpart of FED. R. Civ. P. 34(c)] in itself does not authorize an independent action for discov-
ery, but merely serves the purpose of making it clear that [the rule] does not preclude actions
for discovery against persons not parties.") (citations omitted); see also Note, supra note 89, at
114 n. 18 (citing an interview with the Reporter of the Advisory Committee to the effect that
the Committee did not intend to imply authorization for independent actions to discover
nonparty land).
100 It is clear that the equitable bill of discovery was not abolished by the adoption of the
Federal Rules; at most, it was rendered obsolete. See 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 59, 26.03[3], 26.53; 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE supra note 8, 1 33.03[5]; Sun-
derland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 873 (1933). Moreover, if
the equitable bill was ever preempted by the rules, see note 97 supra, it was revived in 1970 by
the adoption of Rule 34(c). See also Note, supra note 89, at 114-15.
The equitable bill of discovery has been cited as basis for the Rule 34(c) independent
action by the Advisory Committee, courts, and commentators. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(c) Advi-
sory Committee Notes, supra note 97; Home Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Rome, 89 F.R.D.
485, 487-88 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Wolfe v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 366 Mass. 417, 419 n.1, 319
N.E.2d 423, 424 n.1 (1974); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super 471, 505-07, 378
A.2d 53, 70-71 (1977); 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 59, 26.53; Hughes &
Anderson, Discovery." A Competition Between the Right of Privac and the Right to Know, 23 U. FLA.
L. REV. 289, 293 (1971); Note, supra note 89, at 114. Regarding the use of equitable actions
generally, see J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE, CASES AND
MATERIALS 665 (3d ed. 1980) ("Rule 34(c) does not preclude independent proceedings for
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covery in actions at law.' 0 ' Historically, discovery was available in
equity suits but was not permissible in common law actions. 0 2 This
dichotomy resulted from the different functions of the pleadings in
law and equity actions. At law, pleadings were designed to prepare
the case for a trial by reducing the issues to a single question of
fact, 10 3 whereas equity pleadings were intended to assist the court in
fashioning relief. 0 4 Equitable pleadings therefore included a recita-
tion of the facts, a narrative of the evidence, and a set of interrogato-
ries for the adverse party to answer, all of which served to reveal and
focus the issues.' 05 In contrast, pleadings at law became such rigid
and formalized incantations that they failed in their function of elim-
inating unnecessary facts and actually tended to obscure the issues.10 6
Because pleadings at law revealed so little information, 10 7 some
discovery under traditional equitable principles."); Beckwith v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 182
N.J. Super. 376, 380-81, 440 A.2d 1372, 1374-75 (1981).
One commentator has suggested that other sources of authority for an independent ac-
tion might be found in Rule 27(c) actions to perpetuate testimony and the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651 (1976). See Note, supra note 89, at 118. No court has ever mentioned either of
these provisions in this context, and for reasons discussed in note 136, infra, neither provision
is suitable as authority for an independent action for discovery of nonparties' immobile
things.
101 See generally G. RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 1-17 (1932); Miller, The
Mechanism of Fact Discovery: A Study in Comparative Civil Procedure, 32 ILL. L. REV. 424, 437-55
(1938); Sunderland, supra note 100.
102 James, Discovery, 38 YALE L.J. 746 (1929).
103 W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM 27 (1968); G.
RAGLAND, JR., supra note 101; Note, supra note 24, at 946.
104 G. RAGLAND, JR., supra note 101, at 6, 7.
105 A complaint in equity had nine parts. Miller, supra note 101, at 438 & n.266. The
"starting part" contained a narrative of the facts, G. RAGLAND, JR., supra note 101, at 6, and
the "charging part" contained a narrative of the evidence, id at 14; see Note, supra note 24, at
947. Later, equitable complaints came to include an "interrogating part" which consisted of
questions for the adverse party to answer. W. GLASER, supra note 103, at 28; G. RAGLAND,
JR., supra note 101, at 6; Sunderland, supra note 100, at 866; Note, supra note 24, at 947.
Thus the pleadings in equitable actions provided discovery as well as a basis for relief. G.
RAGLAND, JR., supra note 101, at 15; Sunderland, supra note 100, at 866.
106 G. RAGLAND, JR., supra note 101, at 2 (plaintiffs' common law pleadings included
"fictitious and vague allegations which were couched in antiquated terminology"; the plead-
ings were "more concerned with invoking the judicial process by incantation of the precise
ritual than . . . in reciting the facts of the case."); Sunderland, supra note 98, at 863-65
(pleadings obscured issues because the pleader did not have to reveal what kind of proof
existed and because the pleader could allege facts without any intent to prove them); Note,
supra note 24, at 946 ("As the common law developed, the pleadings tended to become for-
malized within a framework of rigid classes of actions; the factual allegations were replaced
by statements of conclusions of law and fact, sometimes fictitious and seldom revealing much
about the controversy.") (footnotes omitted).
107 W. GLASER, supra note 103, at 27 ("Pleadings were supposed to tell the adversary the
essential features of the pleader's case, but in practice they did not. Lawyers learned to reveal
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form of discovery was needed in actions at law.108 To meet this need
equity courts developed the equitable bill of discovery. 0 9 With this
development, a party to an action at law could file a bill in equity to
obtain discovery related to the action at law. This method was the
only significant means available to procure pretrial discovery in com-
mon law actions. 110
The equitable bill of discovery in aid of an action at law was
used for the same purpose in the federal system.'1 ' The federal
courts provided practically no pretrial discovery in actions at law."12
Federal statutes authorized depositions in only very limited circum-
stances, 113 and parties who filed equitable bills often found them de-
as little as possible, hide the weaknesses in their cases, and save key evidence for the dramatic
opportunities at trial.").
108 Id. at 28; Note, supra note 24, at 947.
109 Seegenerally W. GLASER, supra note 103, at 28-29; G. RAGLAND, JR., upra note 101, at
12-13 (1932); James, supra note 102, at 746-47; Sunderland, supra note 100, at 866-69; Note,
upra note 24, at 947-48.
110 One other method did provide some discovery in common law actions: the bill of
particulars. This pleading allowed the parties to obtain from each other additional informa-
tion so as to limit the generality of the pleadings and to avert surprise at trial. See G.
RAGLAND, JR.,supra note 101, at 11; Sunderland, supra note 100, at 865; Note,supra note 24,
at 947. The bill of particulars required the recipient to disclose the information that a reason-
able person would need to prepare for trial but fell short of forcing real disclosure of evidence;
it was a "feeble and restricted" contribution to discovery. Sunderland, supra note 100, at 865.
111 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 59, 26.03[1], at 26-80 to 26-81 (equitable
bill of discovery available in federal courts when plaintiff in bill needed more discovery than
was allowed under federal statutes in action at law).
112 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE, supra note 59, 26.03[1], at 26-74; 4A MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE, supra note 8, 1 35.03[1], at 33-19; James, supra note 102, at 449 & n.321.
Moreover, in spite of a statute which provided that federal procedures in common law
actions had to conform to state procedures, the federal courts held that state discovery meth-
ods were not available in federal courts. Exparle Fisk, 113 U.S. 713 (1885). Se generally 4
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 59, 1 26.03[1], at 26-74 & n.1.
113 Examination before trial was authorized by three methods. A deposition de bene esse
could be taken if the witness would be unavailable at trial. A deposition could be taken
under a dedimus potestatem order when necessary to prevent a failure or delay of justice. Fi-
nally, a deposition in perpetuam rei memoriam could be taken to perpetuate testimony, but only
in equitable actions. See Exparte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 722 (1885); 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE, supra note 59, 1 26.03[1], at 26-75 to 26-79; Note, supra note 24, at 949.
Regarding discovery of documents in federal court, production in actions at law was
governed by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1946). See 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 8, 1 34.03[1], at 34-16 to 34-17; G. RAGLAND, JR., supra note 101, at 187. The wording of
the statute was ambiguous, and courts disagreed on whether the statute authorized produc-
tion before trial or only at trial. See 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 8,
T 34.03[1], at 34-17 & n.1; G. RAGLAND, JR., supra note 101, at 187. The Supreme Court
settled the question in 1911 and held that production could be compelled only at trial. Car-
penter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533 (1911). Thereafter, depositions and subpoenas duces tecum
were still available to compel pretrial production of documents, but since depositions were so
limited, this method did not have a significant impact. See 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
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nied on the basis that statutory discovery remedies were deemed
sufficient. 14 As the need for discovery in federal common law ac-
tions became more apparent, however, equitable bills of discovery
were more frequently granted."15 Ultimately, the United States
Supreme Court endorsed equitable bills of discovery and adopted
comparatively liberal standards for their use.'16
Equitable bills of discovery in the federal system were brought
under Equity Rule 58.1 17 The scope of discovery under this rule was
supra note 8, T 34.03[l], at 34-17 to 34-19; W. GLASER supra note 103, at 28; Note, supra note
24, at 950.
114 See, e.g., Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 F. 135, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); see
also 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 59, T 26.03[1], at 26-80; 4A MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE, supra note 8, T 33.03[1]; James, supra note 102, at 747; Note, supra note 24,
at 949.
115 See Loft, Inc. v. Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 103 F.2d 1, 7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 558
(1939) ("The recent decisions of federal courts indicate a liberal attitude toward the use of
bills of discovery in equity proceedings ancillary to suits at law."); see also 4 MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE, supra note 59, T 26.03[ 1], at 26-80 to 26-81.
116 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689 (1933). The Court
allowed discovery of damages in a breach of contract action through an equitable bill of
discovery. The Court stated:
Help for the solution of problems [of discovery] is not to be looked for in re-
strictive formulas.
The rationale of the [equitable bill] remedy, when used as an auxiliary process
in aid of trials at law, is simplicity itself. At times, cases will not be proved, or will
be proved clumsily or wastefully, if the litigant is not permitted to gather his evi-
dence in advance. When this necessity is made out with reasonable certainty, a bill
in equity is maintainable to give him what he needs.
Id. at 693.
117 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 693 (1933); Arms &
Drury, Inc. v. Burg, 90 F.2d 400, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1937); H. Wagner & Adler Co. v. Mali, 74
F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1935); Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 241 F. 964, 966-67
(S.D.N.Y. 1917); see 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, Supra note 59,1 26.03[1], at 26-81 to 26-
82.
Federal Equity Rule 58 was adopted in 1912 and governed equitable bills of discovery
until 1938 when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supplanted it. Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 308 U.S. 645 (1939); see Nichols v. Sanborn Co., 24 F. Supp. 908 (D, Mass. 1938) (Eq-
uity Rule 58 abrogated by adoption of Federal Rules 26-37). Federal Equity Rule 58
provided in part:
The plaintiff at any time after filing the bill and not later than twenty-one
days after the joinder of issue, and the defendant at any time after filing his answer
and not later than twenty-one days after the joinder of issue, and either party at
any time thereafter by leave of the court or judge, may file interrogatories in writ-
ing for the discovery by the opposite party or parties of facts and documents mate-
rial to the support or defense of the cause, with a note at the foot thereof stating
which of the interrogatories each of the parties is required to answer. But no party
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limited in several ways." 18 For example, the courts held that Equity
Rule 58 prohibited fishing expeditions; before a party could discover
facts, he had to know they existed.1 9 Furthermore, a party could
only discover facts related to his own claim or defense and not facts
exclusively related to the adverse party's case. 120 A party could dis-
cover material or ultimate facts but not evidentiary facts. 21 Today
these historical limits on the scope of discovery available under equi-
table bills of discovery have no impact in the federal system. An
independent action for discovery today would be governed by the
federal rules, 22 and therefore, the scope of discovery would be gov-
erned by Federal Rule 26, which has rejected each of these limits on
the scope of discovery. 123
shall file more than one set of interrogatories to the same party without leave of the
court or judge.
The court or judge, upon motion and reasonable notice, may make all such
orders as may be appropriate to enforce answers to interrogatories or to effect the
inspection or production of documents in the possession of either party and contain-
ing evidence material to the cause of action or defense of his adversary.
118 See generally 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 8, 1 33.03.
119 Indianapolis Amusement Co. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp., 90 F.2d 732
(7th Cir. 1937); Keenan v. Texas Prod. Co., 84 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1936). See generaly 4A
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 8, 33.03[2]. The courts' attitude towards fishing
expeditions for production of documents was clearly expressed by Judge Learned Hand in
Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 241 F. 964, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1917):
If the defendant can be brought to acknowledge the possession of any docu-
ments which appear to be pertinent to the issues, it will be required to produce
them, but not until it does. Any other rule would enable the plaintiff to fish among
all the documents which the defendant may have for the purpose of picking out
those on which it chooses to sue. Such a course is wholly unauthorized, not only
under the old practice (Langdell, §§ 204, 205), but equally under rule 58, which
requires a party to produce only those documents which contain evidence material
to the case or defense of his adversary.
120 May v. Midwest Ref. Co., 10 F. Supp. 927 (D. Me. 1935); Chicago Flexible Shaft Co.
v. Neupert Prod. Corp., 7 F. Supp. 362 (W.D.N.Y. 1934). Contra, Bankers Util. Co. v. David
H. Zell, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); Clairemont Sterilized Egg Co. v. Kasser Egg
Process Co., 14 F.2d 143 (N.D. Cal. 1926). See generall 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 8, 1 33.03[3].
121 May v. Midwest Ref. Co., 10 F. Supp. 927 (D. Me. 1935); Gasoline Prod. Co. v. Amer-
ican Ref. Co., 12 F.2d 98 (D. Del. 1926); Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 241 F.
964, 966 (S.D.N.Y 1917). See generally 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 8,
33.03[5].
122 4 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 59, 26.53; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 1
("These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil
nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity .. ).
123 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 provides in relevant part:
(b)Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
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One other restriction might still limit the equitable bill's efficacy
as a basis for independent action, however. Although the equitable
bill would provide for entry upon land, 124 generally it would only lie
against parties.' 25 Historically, an equitable bill of discovery would
not lie against a mere witness. 26 Rather, the person from whom dis-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable mat-
ter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible
at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
Under Rule 26, it is no longer a valid objection to a discovery request that it is specula-
tive or constitutes a "fishing expedition"; by its terms, the rule specifically allows discovery of
the "existence" of things or persons with knowledge, and the courts have interpreted the rule
to disallow the fishing expedition objection. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)
("No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from
inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case."); Banco Nacional de Credito Ejidal,
S.A. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 11 F.R.D. 497 (N.D. Cal. 1951) (Rule 26 not
subject to restriction on ground that examination constitutes fishing expedition).
Rule 26 also allows discovery of any matter regardless of "whether it relates to the claim
or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party." Thus
the limit under Equity Rule 58 which foreclosed a party from discovering facts relating to his
opponent's case has been abolished; see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Burns v.
Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973) (open disclosure of all potentially relevant
information is "keynote" of discovery provisions of Rule 26); Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 18
F.R.D. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1955) ("[E]ither party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts
he has in his possession, if not otherwise privileged.").
Finally, Rule 26 allows discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action regardless of whether the matter will be admis-
sible at trial. Rule 26 thus abolishes the distinction between material or ultimate facts and
mere evidentiary facts. See Sopkin v. Missouri Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 222 F. Supp. 984 (W.D.
Mo. 1963) (detailed information as to factual claims and legal contentions may be secured
under Rule 26).
124 See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Savage Mining Co., 23 F. Cas. 1113 (C.C.D. Nev. 1867) (No.
13,986). See generaly Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 152 U.S. 160, 172
(1894) ("[C]ourts of equity have, in the exercise of their inherent powers, been in the habit of
ordering inspections of property .... "); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1862, at 632
(Chadbourn rev. 1976).
125 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 124, § 1856d, at 562 ("The principle of a bill of discovery
was never considered to be applicable to thirdpersons notparties .. ") (emphasis in original).
Seegenerally DISCOVERY SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 128 (Equity Rule 58 allowed bill of
discovery against parties only); Note, supra note 89, at 115 (bill in equity for discovery ran
only against parties).
126 See Dehne v. Hillman Inv. Co., 110 F.2d 456, 458 (3d Cir. 1940) ("At common law a
bill of discovery was demurrable if it lay against a defendant who was a mere witness.");
Wolfe v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 366 Mass. 417, 419, 319 N.E.2d 423, 425 (1974), relying on
American Sec. & Trust Co. v. Brooks, 225 Mass. 500, 502, 114 N.E. 732, 733 (1917); Arcell v.
Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 507, 378 A.2d 53, 71 (1977) ("It is clear that a 'mere
witness' cannot be named a defendant in an action for discovery.") (citations omitted); I J.
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covery was sought had to be a party to the main litigation 127 or at
least have an interest in the litigation. 128 This "mere witness" rule
was applied in both state129 and federal courts. 130 Although this rule
has various exceptions 131 and modern courts seem inclined to find
some way around the rule, 132 only two jurisdictions have explicitly
rejected it. 133
B. Weakness in the Federal Practice
This mere witness rule seriously undermines the equitable bill as
authority for independent actions. Unlike the expansion of discovery
which Rule 26 achieves, the extension of equitable bills of discovery
to nonparties is more troublesome because mere application of the
present federal rules would not accomplish it. Instead, the courts
would have to make the extension with no specific authority in the
rules. While it seems clear that the federal courts have the inherent
power to extend the bill of discovery to nonparties, 3 4 such an exten-
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 199, at 286 (4th ed. 1918) ("[M]ere witnesses cannot
be joined as defendants and obliged to answer.").
127 See note 125 supra.
128 Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 507, 378 A.2d 53, 71 (1977) (bill of
discovery allowed against nonparty corporation because it had pecuniary interest in action);
see also I J. POMEROY, supra note 126, § 199, at 285 ("[N]o person can properly be made a
defendant in the suit for a discovery, or compelled as such to disclose facts within his knowl-
edge, unless he has an interest in the subject matter of the controversy in aid of which the
discovery is asked."); 27 C.J.S. Dicovery § 10, at 21 (1959) (bills of discovery not confined to
parties and will lie against one with interest in subject matter of main action).
129 - See, e.g., Wolfe v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 366 Mass. 417, 420, 319 N.E.2d 423, 425
(1974) (mere witness rule reiterated but bill of discovery allowed as within exception to rule).
130 See, e.g., Dehne v. Hillman Inv. Co., 110 F.2d 345, 458 (3d Cir. 1940) (bill for discovery
dismissed against company because it was not party to primary litigation).
131 See, e.g., Arms & Drury, Inc. v. Burg, 90 F.2d 400, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (bill will lie
against nonparty to obtain names of proper defendants); Finance Co. of Am. v. Brock, 80
F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1936) (bill will lie against corporate officers to aid action against corpora-
tion); Post & Co. v. Toledo, C. & St. L. R.R., 144 Mass. 341, 11 N.E. 540 (1887) (same); Wolfe
v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 366 Mass. 417, 420, 319 N.E.2d 423, 425 (1974) (bill will lie
against public instrumentality to aid action by private plaintiff); Walker v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 134 N.J. Eq. 544,36 A.2d 497 (1944) (bill will lie against nonparty to obtain names and
addresses of proper parties).
132 See, e.g., Wolfe v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 366 Mass 417, 420, 319 N.E.2d 423, 425
(1974) (exception created to allow bill to lie against public instrumentality); Arcell v. Ashland
Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 507, 378 A.2d 53, 71 (1977) (bill allowed against private
corporation on the basis that it had an interest in the main action.).
133 See Therrien v. Public Serv. Co., 108 A.2d 48, 51 (N.H. 1954); Beckwith v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 182 NJ. Super. 376, 382, 440 A.2d 1372, 1375 (1981).
None of the reported decisions on this mere witness rule offers any rationale for it. Prob-
ably it reflects a notion that nonparties have a right not to be inconvenienced and drawn into
others' litigation unless they have some interest in it.
134 See DISCOVERY SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 128 (Albert Sacks, Professor and Advi-
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sion would repudiate considerable precedent. l35 The drastic judicial
extension necessary before the independent action could fulfill the
purpose contemplated by Rule 34(c) renders the equitable bill of dis-
covery a weak source of authority for an independent action. 136
Even assuming that the courts could extend the equitable bill to
provide discovery against nonparties, the broader concept of an in-
dependent action is problematic. To file an independent action in
federal court, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action. 3 7 One might argue that ancil-
lary jurisdiction would exist, 138 but no court has accepted this princi-
ple, 3 9 and the one court which has confronted such a jurisdictional
sory Committee Reporter, commenting that court may extend bills of discovery to nonparties
by "reading the prior history rather liberally"); Note, supra note 89, at 114 n.18 (relating
interview with Reporter Sacks indicating that Advisory Committee intended to leave shaping
of discovery device to courts).
135 See notes 125-34 supra and accompanying text.
136 As mentioned in note 100 supra, one commentator has suggested two other possible
sources of authority for a Rule 34(c) independent action for discovery: the Rule 27(c) action
to perpetuate testimony and the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976). See Note, supra
note 89, at 118. Each of these provisions has a characteristic which renders it unsuitable as
authority for an independent action to discover nonparties' immobile things. The action to
perpetuate testimony can be used only to discover facts known to exist, see 1 J. POMEROY, A
TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 210-11 (5th ed. 1941). The All Writs Statute can
be used for discovery only in actions to which the federal rules do not apply, see Neuwirth v.
Merin, 267 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Note, supra note 89, at 118-19.
137 See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694,
702 (1982) ("Subject matter jurisdiction, then, is an Art. III as well as a statutory require-
ment; it functions as a restriction on federal power. ... ).
138 See Note, supra note 89, at 117 n.32 (ancillary jurisdiction over subject matter would
exist for Rule 34(c) independent actions by analogy to Rule 27(a) petitions to perpetuate
testimony).
139 No court has decided whether an independent action for production under Rule 34(c)
is cognizable based on ancillary jurisdiction.
Historically, the equitable bill of discovery did operate on ancillary jurisdiction. Eichel
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 245 U.S. 102 (1917); Loft, Inc. v. Corn Prod. Ref. Co.,
103 F.2d 1, 9-11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 558 (1939); Baush Mach. Tool Co. v. Alumi-
num Co. of Am., 63 F.2d 778, 779-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 739 (1933). But histori-
cally the equitable bill of discovery ran only against parties, and these cited decisions consider
ancillary jurisdiction only with respect to parties. The fact that the equitable bill was filed
against a party to the primary action was clearly a factor in the Second Circuit's decision in
Baush Machine to grant ancillary jurisdiction: "The suit [for discovery] is between the same
parties, and is in aid of. . . the action at law, and is brought within the same jurisdiction.
These facts are sufficient for jurisdictional purposes." d. at 779-80. Whether ancillary juris-
diction would be extended to actions against nonparties is a different question. Cf. Union
Solvents Corp. v. Butacet Corp., 2 F. Supp. 375 (D. Del. 1933), interpreted by the Advisory
Committee to hold that an equitable bill to perpetuate testimony, the precursor of Rule 27(a)
petitions to perpetuate testimony which may lie against nonparties, did not operate on ancil-
lary jurisdiction but required independent grounds. 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 59, 1 27.03 at 27-12 n.4; see Note, supra note 89, at 117 n.32.
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question did not mention ancillary jurisdiction."4° If the plaintiff
could not establish independent jurisdictional grounds' 4' and ancil-
lary jurisdiction were held not to exist, the plaintiff would be forced
to pursue the discovery action in state court.
Independent actions present yet another hurdle in procuring
personal jurisdiction over the nonparty from whom discovery is
sought. 42 If the nonparty can be served with process within the state
where the principal action is pending, 43 or outside the state based on
a long-arm statute, 44 jurisdiction is established. But if the nonparty
is beyond the reach of service by these methods, the plaintiff would
have to file the independent action in a forum other than the one
where the principal litigation is pending. In this event, the plaintiff
would have to establish independent grounds for jurisdiction over the
subject matter of discovery, as the court would most likely deny an-
cillary jurisdiction. 45 Thus, the plaintiff might be unable to estab-
140 Home Ins. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Rome, 89 F.R.D. 485 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
141 For independent grounds, the plaintiff would have to establish either the presence of a
federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
The plaintiff might have difficulty showing jurisdiction under § 1331 as the single court
which has construed Rule 34(c) specifically held that it did not provide federal question juris-
diction. Home Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Rome, 89 F.R.D. 485, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
("[P]laintiff's reliance on Rule 34(c) as the basis for jurisdiction in this case is misplaced.
That rule does not create a federal cause of action. . . ."). The plaintiff might likewise have
difficulty establishing jurisdiction under § 1332 because even if diversity were present, the
plaintiff would still have to show that the matter in controversy - presumably the produc-
tion - exceeded Sl0,000.
142 See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694,
702 (1982) ("The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows. . . from the Due
Process Clause. The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual
liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power . . ").
143 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(l) ("All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere
within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held . . ").
144 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 302(a) (McKinney 1976); UNIF. INTERSTATE AND
INT'L PROCED. AcT § 1.03, 13 U.L.A. 466 (1962). Most long-arm statutes include ownership
of property within the state as a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over nonresidents.
See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 302(a)(4) (McKinney 1976); UNIF. INTERSTATE AND INT'L
PROCED. AcT § 103(a)(5), 13 U.L.A. 466 (1962). Thus if the primary litigation were pending
in the jurisdiction where the nonparty's immobile property was located, personal jurisdiction
for the independent action could be obtained over the nonparty on the basis of this ownership
under the state long-arm statute.
145 There is no reported case extending ancillary jurisdiction to a bill of discovery filed in
a forum other than the primary forum. On the contrary, there is some authority implying
that ancillary jurisdiction would exist for a discovery bill only if it were litigated in the same
forum as the principal action. See Loft, Inc. v. Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 103 F.2d 1, 9-10 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 558 (1939) (ancillary jurisdiction extended to equitable bill of dis-
covery in part because bill was filed in the same court as primary action); Baush Mach. Tool
Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 63 F.3d 778, 779-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 739 (1933).
In Baush Machine, the Second Circuit stated:
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lish both subject matter and personal jurisdiction in the same
forum. 146
Aside from these jurisdictional problems, the independent ac-
tion also entails practical drawbacks. The necessity of a subsidiary
action to prosecute the primary action means increased expense for
everyone, increased burden on already clogged courts, and delay in
the primary litigation. 147 Moreover, the rules' reliance on an in-
dependent action leaves the discovering attorney with only obscure
and obsolete historical remedies as authority for the action.' 48
[I]t is not clear that a bill of discovery may be brought in any district where the
corporation is found or does business regardless of the district where the suit at law,
which the bill is meant to aid, is pursued. . . . However, the bill of discovery [in
the instant ease] is in aid of an action at law in the same district, and we think is
dependent and ancillary for jurisdictional purposes, and jurisdiction over the bill
may be sustained because of the jurisdiction had over the action at law. The suit is
between the same parties, and is in aid of the claim of damages in the action at
law, and is brought within the samejurisdiction. These facts are sufficient for jurisdic-
tional purposes.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Note, supra note 89, at 117 n.34.
Aside from the fact that there is no authority supporting the extension of ancillary juris-
diction to an equitable bill of discovery filed outside the forum of the primary litigation, it
seems unlikely that a court would ever be inclined to find ancillary jurisdiction for compara-
ble independent actions filed outside the principal forum. Where the independent action is in
a different forum, many advantages of ancillary jurisdiction like judicial economy and avoid-
ance of piecemeal litigation are lost.
146 Ironically, the Advisory Committee noted that one reason it chose not to provide for
production by nonparties in Rule 34 was that the jurisdictional problems were "very com-
plex." FED. R. Civ. P. 34(c) advisory committee notes from 1970 Amendment. Certainly the
jurisdictional problems of providing for discovery within Rule 34 are no more complex than
the jurisdictional problems presented by reliance on an independent action. See also J.B. LE-
VINE, DISCOVERY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN CIVIL DISCOVERY,
LAW WITH REFORM PROPOSAL 105-06 (1982).
Aside from these jurisdictional problems, reliance on an independent action might pre-
sent a question under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). If the primary action was
based on diversity jurisdiction, arguably the parties to the subsidiary independent action for
discovery would be required to rely on state law as authority for the independent action. This
argument is not persuasive. With the exception of the instant situation, the process and rights
of discovery are defined in detail in the federal rules. The considerations which compel the
conclusion that discovery is procedural in all these other contexts should lead to the same
conclusion regarding independent actions for discovery. See generally Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460 (1965); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). Thus the parties to the in-
dependent action would rely on federal law in defining the independent action.
147 For discussion of the drawbacks of independent actions, see text accompanying notes
19-36 supra.
148 An attorney researching inspection of nonparties' immobile property is left with little
guidance. Rule 34(c) itself is skeletal and the Advisory Committee's Notes are cursory. See
note 97 supra. Since Rule 34(c) was adopted in 1970, few courts have construed it. See note
31 supra. Once the attorney discovers that Rule 34(c) does not create or authorize indepen-
dent actions, he is left to research historical remedies in a search for authority for an indepen-
dent action. Moreover, once the attorney identifies the equitable bill of discovery as a
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Finally, the independent action approach undermines the goals
of the federal rules, which seek "the just, speedy and inexpensive de-
termination of every action."' 49 An independent action for discovery
is neither speedy nor inexpensive.t5 0 Reliance on an independent ac-
tion also contravenes specific policies of the discovery rules. The dis-
covery rules were designed "to replace the unrelated and haphazard
devices which had developed by a process of historical accretion with
an integrated and efficient system of pretrial investigation,"'' but
bringing an independent action for discovery of a nonparty's immo-
bile property is not an efficient means of discovery.152 In view of all
these weaknesses inherent in the independent action, it is not surpris-
ing that several states have acted to avoid these problems in their
own discovery systems.
C. Current State Practice
The current federal scheme limits the scope of Rule 34 to parties
and utilizes an independent action to provide access to nonparties'
immobile things. Most states have simply taken the same approach
as the federal rules, 53 but six states have adopted provisions which
allow the filing of a request or motion for production against nonpar-
ties.' 54 The states which in essence have extended Rule 34 to non-
possible source of authority, probably through the reference in the Advisory Committee's
Notes, see note 97supra, the attorney discovers that historically it ran only against parties, and
that the court must be persuaded to make a significant expansion of the authority.
149 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
150 See notes 19-36 supra and accompanying text.
151 Note, supra note 89, at 119.
152 The use of an independent action under Rule 34(c) is also contrary to the trend to
extrajudicial discovery evident in Rules 34(a) and (b). In 1970, the same year subdivision (c)
was adopted, the motion requirement was deleted from subdivisions (a) and (b). As one
commentator noted, "It was surely inconsistent to provide extrajudicial discovery of parties'
land in one section of Rule 34 and at the same time to resurrect independent actions for
discovery on nonparties' land in another section." Note, supra note 89, at 119 (emphasis in
original).
153 See, e.g., TENN. R. Civ. P. 34, 45; UTAH R. Civ. P. 34, 45; Wyo. CT. R. 34, 45. Some
states have made minor variations. See, e.g., OR. R. Civ. P. 43 (variation on FED. R. Civ. P.
34); Ky. R. Civ. P. 45 (variation on FED. R. Civ. P. 45).
154 This was the suggestion made by the Advisory Committee on the federal rules. In its
Notes to Rule 34(c), the Committee stated that the "ideal solution" to the problem of discov-
ery of nonparties' immobile things was "to provide for discovery against persons not parties in
Rule 34."
Today, the Illinois rules on production of things are essentially the same as the federal
rules. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 214 is analogous to Federal Rule 34 in that it limits re-
quests for production to the parties to the action and then provides that independent actions
against nonparties are not precluded. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 214 (Smith-Hurd 1968 &
Supp. 1982). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 204 is analogous to Federal Rule 45 in that it
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parties include Alabama,155  Georgia,156  Indiana,1 57  New
provides for discovery of things from nonparties by deposition and subpoena duces tecum.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, § 204 (Smith-Hurd 1968 & Supp. 1982). The extent of similarity
between the two systems is evident from the Committee Comments following Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 214, which might as well be describing the federal system.
The request procedure may be utilized only when discovery is sought from a
party to the action. Discovery of documents and tangible things in the custody or
control of a person not a party may be obtained by serving him with a subpoena duces
tecum for the taking of his deposition. The last paragraph of the rule was added to
indicate that the rule is not preemptive of an independent action for discovery in
the nature of a bill in equity. Such an action can be employed, then, in the occa-
sional case in which a party seeks to inspect real estate that is in the custody or
control of a person not a party to the main action.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, § 214 (Smith-Hurd 1968 & Supp. 1982) (Committee Comments).
Illinois' system was not always so similar to the federal system. Prior to 1974, Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 214 provided that "any party may move for an order directing any
other party or person to produce . . . documents, objects, or tangible things." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. I10A, § 214 (Smith-Hurd 1968) (emphasis added). In 1974, this rule was amended. The
phrase "or person" was deleted and the language referring to independent actions was added.
Thus while several states have moved to extend their counterparts of Rule 34 to nonparties,
see text accompanying notes 155-208 infra, Illinois has moved to limit its counterpart of Rule
34.
155 ALA. R. Civ. P. 34 provides in relevant part:
Production of documents and things and entry upon land for inspection and other
purposes.
(a) Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request and on any person
not a party a subpoena (1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or
someone acting on his behalf, to inspect and copy, any designated documents (in-
cluding writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phono-records, and other
data compilations from which information can be obtained, translated, if necessary,
by the respondent through detection devices into reasonably usable form), or to
inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible things which constitute or contain
matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which are in the possession, custody or
control of the person upon whom the request or subpoena is served; or (2) to permit
entry upon designated land or other property in the possession or control of the
person upon whom the request or subpoena is served for the purpose of inspection
and measuring, surveying, photographing, testing, or sampling the property or any
designated object or operation thereon, within the scope of Rule 26(b).
(b) Procedure
(2) Subpoena To A Person Not A Party
(A) NOTICE. A party who desires to obtain production of documents or
things or permission to enter upon land or other property from a person not a party
shall serve a notice to every other party of the intent to serve a subpoena upon the
expiration of 15 days from the service of the notice and the proposed subpoena shall
be attached to the notice. The court may allow a shorter or longer time. Such
notice may be served without leave of court upon the expiration of 45 days after
service of the summons and complaint or other mode of service under Rule 4
through Rule 4.4 upon any defendant, except that leave is not required within the
45-day period if a defendant has previously sought discovery. Any person or party
may serve an objection to the issuance of the subpoena within 10 days of the service
of said notice and in such event the subpoena shall not issue. The party serving the
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notice may move for an order under Rule 37(a) with respect to such objection. If
no objection is timely served, the clerk shall cause the subpoena to be issued upon
the expiration of 15 days from the service of the notice or upon the expiration of
such other time as may have been allowed by the court.
(B) SUBPOENA. The subpoena shall be directed to a person at a stated ad-
dress and, if the name of the person is not known, the subpoena shall give a general
description sufficient to identify the person or the particular class or group to which
the person belongs. The subpoena shall set forth the items to be inspected either by
individual item or by category, and describe each item and category with reason-
able particularity. The subpoena shall specify a reasonable time no less than 15
days after service unless the court orders otherwise, and the manner of making the
inspection and performing the related acts. Such activities with reference to docu-
ments or tangible things shall take place where the documents or tangible things
are regularly kept or at some other reasonable place designated by the recipient.
The subpoena may give the recipient an option to deliver or mail legible copies of
documents or things to the party serving the subpoena, but the recipient may con-
dition the preparation of copies on the payment in advance of the reasonable cost of
making such copies. Any other party shall have the right to be present at the time
of compliance with the subpoena. The subpoena shall advise the recipient of the
right to object at any time prior to the date set forth in the subpoena for compli-
ance therewith. Such objection shall be communicated in writing to the party serv-
ing the subpoena. The party serving the subpoena may move for an order under
Rule 37(a) with respect to any objection to or the failure to comply with a sub-
poena or any part thereof.
156 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-34 (1982) provides in relevant part:
Production of documents and things and entry [upon] land for inspection and
other purposes.
(a) Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request:
(1) To produce and permit the party making the request. . . to inspect and copy
any designated documents (including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photo-
graphs, phono-records, and other data compilation from which information can be
obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent through detection devices into
reasonably usable form), or to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible things
which constitute or contain matters within the scope of subsection (b) of Code Sec-
tion 9-11-26 and which are in the possession, custody, or control of the party upon
whom the request is served; or
(2) To permit entry upon designated land or other property in the possession or
control of the party upon whom the request is served for the purpose of inspection
and measuring, surveying, photographing, testing, or sampling the property or any
designated object or operation thereon, within the scope of subsection (b) of Code
Section 9-11-26.
(c) Applicability to nonparties. This Code section shall also be applicable with
respect to discovery against persons, firms, or corporations who are not parties, in
which event a copy of the request shall be served upon all parties of record; or,
upon notice, the party desiring such discovery may proceed by taking the deposi-
tion of the person, firm, or corporation on oral examination or upon written ques-
tions under Code Section 9-11-30 or 9-11-31. The nonparty or any party may file
an objection as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section. If the party desiring
such discovery moves for an order under paragraph (a) of Code Section 9-11-37 to
compel discovery, he shall make a showing of good cause to support his motion.
157 IND. R. TRIAL P. 34 provides in relevant part:
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York,' 58 Oklahoma, 59 and Texas.1 60
The states which have extended Rule 34 to nonparties take
Production of Documents and Things and Entry Upon Land for Inspection and
Other Purposes
(A) Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request:
(1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on his
behalf, to inspect and copy, any designated documents (including without limita-
tion, writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phono-records, and other
data compilations from which intelligence can be perceived, with or without the
use of detection devices) or to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible things
which constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule 26(B) and which are
in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served;
or (2) to permit entry upon designated land or other property in the possession or
control of the party upon whom the request is served for the purpose of inspection
and measuring, surveying, photographing, testing, or sampling the property or any
designated object or operation thereon, within the scope of Rule 26(B).
(C) Application to non-parties. A witness or person other than a party may be re-
quested to produce or permit the matters allowed by subdivision (A) of this rule.
Such request shall be served upon other parties and included in or with a subpoena
served upon such witness or person. The request shall contain the matter provided
in subdivision (B) of this rule. It shall also state that the witness or person to whom
it is directed is entitled to security against damages or payment of damages result-
ing from such request and may respond to such request by submitting to its terms,
by proposing different terms, by objecting specifically or generally to the request by
serving a written response to the party making the request within thirty [30] days,
or by moving to quash as permitted by Rule 45(B). Any party, witness or person
upon whom the request properly is made may respond to the request as provided in
subdivision (B) of this rule. If the response of the witness or person to whom it is
directed is unfavorable, if he moves to quash, if he refuses to cooperate after re-
sponding or fails to respond, or if he objects, the party making the request may
move for an order under Rule 37(A) with respect to any such response or objection.
In granting an order under this subdivision and Rule 37(A)(2) the court shall con-
dition relief upon the prepayment of damages to be proximately incurred by the
witness or person to whom the request is directed or require an adequate surety
bond or other indemnity conditioned against such damages. Such damages shall
include reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in reasonable resistance and in establish-
ing such threatened damage or damages.
158 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. 3120 (McKinney 1970) provides in relevant part:
Discovery and production of documents and things for inspection, testing, copying
or photographing
(a) As against party:
1. After commencement of an action, any party may serve on any other party
notice:
(i) to produce and permit the party seeking discovery, or someone acting on
his behalf, to inspect, copy, test or photograph any specifically designated docu-
ments or any things which are in the possession, custody or control of the party
served, specified with reasonable particularity in the notice; or
(ii) to permit entry upon designated land or other property in the possession,
custody or control of the party served for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying, sampling, testing, photographing or recording by motion pictures or
otherwise the property or any specifically designated object or operation thereon.
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somewhat divergent approaches. The fundamental difference in
their procedures is the extent of court involvement in the production.
Two states, Alabama and Indiana, have adopted rules quite similar
(b) As against non-party. A person not a party may be directed by order to do
whatever a party may be directed to do under subdivision (a). The motion for such
order shall be on notice to all adverse parties; the non-party shall be served with the
notice of motion in the same manner as a summons. The order shall contain, in
addition to such specifications as the notice is required to contain under paragraph
two of subdivision (a), provision for the defraying of the expenses of the non-party.
159 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3211 (West Supp. 1982) provides in relevant part:
Production of Documents and Things and Entry Upon Land for Inspection and
Other Purposes
A. SCOPE. Any party may serve on any other party a request:
1. To produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on his
behalf, to inspect and copy any designated documents including, but not limited to,
writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, motion picture films, phonograph
records, tape and video recordings, records and other data compilations from which
information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent through
detection devices into reasonably usable form, or to inspect and copy, test or sample
any tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of subsec-
tion B of section 3 of the Discovery Code and which are in the possession, custody
or control of the party upon whom the request is served; or
2. To permit entry upon designated land or other property in the possession or
control of the party upon whom the request is served for the purpose of inspection
and measuring, surveying, photographing, testing or sampling the property or any
designated object or operation thereon, within the scope of subsection B of section 3
of the Discovery Code.
C. 1. INSPECTION OF PROPERTY OF NONPARTY. Upon motion of any party
showing that he has a substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his
case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials and upon notice to the other parties to the action and to
the person in possession, custody or control of the property involved, a court may
make any order in regard to property in the possession, custody or control of a
person who is not a party to the action that it could make under subsection A of
this section in regard to property in the possession, custody or control of party to the
action.
2. PROCEDURE. Upon filing the motion to discover, the party requesting discovery
shall give notice to all other parties by serving a copy of the motion and notice for
hearing upon each party or his attorney. The person in possession or control of the
property shall be served as required for service of summons. The notice shall state
the date, time and place of the hearing on the motion and the date shall be not less
than ten (10) days after the service on the person in possession, custody or control.
The court in its discretion may set a shorter time. If the motion is granted the order
shall specify the time, place, manner, scope and conditions of making the inspection
and performing any related acts permitted under subsection A of this section. The
order may further provide that adverse parties may perform any act that the re-
questing party could have performed after the requesting party has completed his
discovery.
160 TEx. R. Civ. P. 167 provides in relevant part:
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to Federal Rule 34, but have varied their rules to allow service of a
subpoena on nonparties. 16 1 Production in these states is therefore
primarily extrajudicial: the clerk issues the subpoena, and the court
only gets involved if a motion to compel or motion for protective
order is filed.162 In Georgia, the production scheme is even more ex-
trajudicial; the Georgia rule does not require a subpoena, but merely
states that a party may request production from a nonparty. 163 In
contrast, the provisions of three states require routine court involve-
ment in all productions. New York, Oklahbma, and Texas allow
production from nonparties by motion and order only.1 64
The extrajudicial procedure is better than the motion and order
system because it consumes less court time over the long term. 65 Ob-
viously, under either procedure if the nonparty objects, the court will
Discovery and Production of Documents and Things for Inspection, Copying
or Photographing
The scope of discovery permitted herein is as provided by Rule 186a and sub-
ject to the protections of Rule 186b:
1. PROCEDURE: Any party may serve on any other party a REQUEST:
(a) to produce and permit the party making the REQUEST, or someone acting
on his behalf, to inspect, sample, test, photograph and/or copy, any designated
documents (including papers, books, accounts, writings, drawings, graphs, charts,
photographs, any insurance agreement under which any person or entity carrying
on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which
may be rendered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to
satisfy the judgment), recordings and other data compilations from which informa-
tion can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent through appropri-
ate devices into reasonably usable form, and to inspect, sample, test, photograph, or
copy any tangible things which constitute or contain matters which are in the pos-
session, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served;
(b) to permit entry upon designated land or other property in the possession or
control of the party upon whom the request is served for the purpose of inspection
and measuring, surveying, photographing, testing, or sampling the property or any
designated object or operation thereon.
4. NONPARTIES: The court may order a person, organizational entity, govern-
ment agency or corporation not a party to the suit to produce in accordance with
this rule. However, such order shall be made only after the filing of a motion set-
ting forth with specific particularity the request, necessity therefor and after notice
and hearing. All parties and the nonparty shall have the opportunity to assert ob-
jections at the hearing.
161 See ALA. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A); IND. R. TRIAL P. 34(C).
162 See ALA. R. Civ. P. 45(a) (clerk issues subpoena); IND. R. TRIAL P. 45(A) (same).
163 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-34(c) (1982).
164 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. 3120(b) (McKinney 1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3211(c)
(West Supp. 1982); TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(4). This practice of allowing production only on
motion and order is comparable to practice under Federal Rule 34 before it was revised in
1970 to operate on request. See generaly C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2207 (1970).
165 Cf. J.B. LEVINE, supra note 146, at 106 (court order is preferable to subpoena for in-
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be involved to resolve the dispute. But if no one objects to the pro-
duction, it is unnecessary to require court involvement. 166
The state's discovery methods also vary in their resolution of the
personal jurisdiction issue.' 67 Generally, courts have no power over
persons who are not subject to their jurisdiction. 168 The states have
taken three distinct approaches to establishing personal jurisdiction
over nonparties. In Alabama and Indiana, where production is ac-
complished by subpoena, the subpoena service requirements guaran-
tee that personal jurisdiction exists. 169 In New York and Oklahoma,
where court order authorizes production, the motion papers for the
production must be served on the nonparty in the same manner as -a
summons.°7 0 Therefore, all the personal jurisdiction requirements as-
sociated with service of process are incorporated as limits on motions
for production. In sharp contrast, the Georgia and Texas provisions
include nothing which might serve to establish personal jurisdiction
over the nonparty.1 71
spection of immobile property because "it has never been the function of a subpoena to order
a non-party . . .to permit inspection of his real property.").
166 Saving court time was one of the benefits cited by the Advisory Committee when
Federal Rule 34 was revised in 1970 to operate extrajudicially. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a)
advisory committe note ("Although an extrajudicial procedure will not drastically alter ex-
isting practice under Rule 34 ... it has the potential of saving court time in a substantial
though proportionately small number of cases tried annually.").
167 This question of jurisdiction was one of the stumbling blocks that dissuaded the Advi-
sory Committee from the "ideal solution" of extending Federal Rule 34 to nonparties. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 34(c), advisory committee note ("While an ideal solution to this problem is to
provide for discovery against persons not parties in Rule 34, both the jurisdictional and proce-
dural problems are very complex.").
168 See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S.
694 (1982) (due process clause requires that personal jurisdiction exist before court may enter
valid order).
169 See ALA. R. Civ. P. 45(c) and (d); IND. R. TRIAL P. 45(C) and (D). Both rules include
particular service requirements for subpoenas and territorial limits on their efficacy. For a
discussion of subpoenas as establishing personal jurisdiction in the federal system, see Ghandi
v. Police Dep't of Detroit, 74 F.R.D. 115, 119-21 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Elder-Beerman Stores
Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
170 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. § 3120(b) (McKinney 1970) ("[T]he nonparty shall be served
with notice of motion [for disclosure] in the same manner as a summons."); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 3211(c)(2) (West Supp. 1982) ("The person in possession or control of the
property shall be served [with the motion for production and notice of hearing] as required
for service of summons.'). The Practice Commentary following New York Rule 3120 notes
that since the nonparty witness "is not a party to the action, jurisdictional requirements are
satisfied by the stipulation that the notice of motion be served on him 'in the same manner as
a summons'." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. § 3120 comment C3120:12.
171 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-34(c) (1982); TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(4). The absence of any
provision on personal jurisdiction is particularly striking in view of the legislative history from
New York on this issue. The Eleventh Annual Report of the Judicial Conference of the State
of New York, issued in 1966, included a study on the disclosure provisions of the Civil Prac-
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Among the three approaches to personal jurisdiction, the first
two procedures-service of a subpoena and service of motion papers
in the same manner as a summons-are equally effective in establish-
ing personal jurisdiction and entail comparable expenditures of time
and money. 172 Neither procedure is markedly superior. However,
either of these procedures is better than the Georgia/Texas approach
which makes no provision for establishing personal jurisdiction.
Clearly, if a party served a nonparty with a request or motion for
production which did not include a subpoena and was not served as
a summons, the nonparty could refuse to produce and the court
would be powerless to sanction the nonparty. 73
Another interesting issue in the states which have extended Rule
34 is whether the regular discovery standards govern, or whether
some extraordinary showing must be made for production from non-
parties. The states with production by subpoena require no addi-
tional showing; the party seeking production must merely meet the
threshold standards required for all discovery, namely that the infor-
mation sought is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action
and is not privileged. 174 On the other hand, four states mandate
some special showing before a party can compel production from a
nonparty. In Texas, the motion for production must demonstrate
tice Law and Rules by Professor David D. Siegel. In his study, Professor Siegel recommended
that CPLR 3120, which at the time provided for production only from parties, be amended to
allow production from nonparty witnesses. Siegel, Disclosure Under the CPLR." Taking Stock
After Two Years in Eleventh Annual Report of the Judicial Conference of the State of New
York 148, 190. Siegel's proposed amendment provided:
A person not a party may be directed to do whatever a party may be directed
to do under subdivision (a). Such direction shall be by order containing, in addi-
tion to such specifications as the notice is required to contain under subdivision (a),
provision for its service on the nonparty and the defraying of his expenses.
Id. at 208 (Appendix C). The New York legislature took Professor Siegel's suggestion and
amended CPLR 3120 to operate against nonparties but felt it necessary to insert a provision
requiring that the motion be served on the nonparty as a summons. See note 170 supra. As
Professor Siegel explains in the Practice Commentary following the adopted version of CPLR
3120, this provision on service functions to satisfy personal jurisdiction requirements. See
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. R. § 3120 comment C3120:12, at 523. In view of this legislative history from
New York, and in view of Oklahoma's similar decision to require that the motion for produc-
tion be served as a summons, see note 170 supra, the Georgia and Texas provisions' silence on
personal jurisdiction is very curious. Perhaps the drafters contemplated that the courts would
impose personal jurisdiction requirements.
172 See note 28 supra.
173 See J.B. LEVINE, supra note 146, at 104 (recommending that Rule 45(d) be used for
production because "disregard of a Rule 34 request by a non-party would expose him to no
sanctions").
174 ALA. R. C. P. 26(b)(1); IND. R. TRIAL P. 26(B)(1). This is the same general standard
used in the federal system. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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the "necessity" for the production. 75 In New York, the party seeking
discovery must show that "special circumstances" exist for the pro-
duction.1 76 But the New York courts have construed this phrase to
require only a minimal showing. 77 In practice a demonstration that
the nonparty possesses something relevant to the case and will not
permit inspection voluntarily will qualify as a "special circum-
stance."' 78 In Oklahoma, the motion for production must establish
that the movant has a substantial need for the materials and cannot
without undue hardship obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials elsewhere.'7 9 This familiar two-prong showing is identical
to that which Federal Rule 26(b)(3) requires for a party to obtain
things prepared in anticipation of litigation. 80 Finally, the Georgia
statute takes a middle course and requires a showing of "good cause"
before production will be compelled.' 8 ' Unlike the other states, this
175 TEx. R. Civ. P. 167(4).
176 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. § 3101(a) provides: "There shall be full disclosure of all evidence
material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action . . . by . . . any person
where the court on motion determines that there are adequate special circumstances."
Amended N.Y. CIv. PRAC. R. § 3120 "does not dispense with the requirement of CPLR 3101
that a special circumstance be shown to justify discovery and inspection . . . against a non-
party.". N.Y. CIV. PRAC. R. § 3120 comment C3120:12, at 525.
177 See, e.g., Kelly v. Shafiroff, 436 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1981) (mere showing by attorney that he
needs witness' pretrial deposition in order to prepare fully for trial suffices as a special circum-
stance under CPLR 21201); accord Villano v. Conde Nast Publications, 361 N.Y.S.2d 351
(1974); Kenford Co. v. Erie County, 340 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1973).
178 The Practice Commentary following New York Rule 3120 states, "[T]he mere fact
that the nonparty has in his possession something relevant to the case, and will not permit
inspection of it voluntarily, would usuallyperse qualify as the needed 'special circumstance'."
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. R. § 3120 comment C3120:12, at 525.
179 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 321 1(c)(1) (West Supp. 1982).
180 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (party may discover materials prepared in anticipation of
litigation "only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials . . . and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means.').
Federal case law interpreting this standard in the work product context will be relied on
by the Oklahoma courts to construe the same standard in the context of discovery from non-
parties. See Minnis, Civil Discovery in Oklahoma Revisited Under the New Code, 18 TULSA LJ. 173,
174 (1982) (footnotes omitted):
The drafters of the New Code relied heavily on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for much of the precise language used. The Oklahoma courts have con-
sistently recognized that when the Oklahoma legislature enacts statutes adopted
from another jurisdiction, the constructions placed on those statutes by courts of the
other jurisdiction became persuasive authority when interpreting the Oklahoma
statute. Accordingly, federal cases prior to adoption of the New Code interpreting
the federal rules will undoubtedly be quite persuasive authority for the meaning of
the New Code, particularly when the words in the New Code match exactly those
in the federal rules.
181 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-34(c) (1982).
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special showing need not be made in the initial request for produc-
tion. Instead, a nonparty seeking discovery must make a showing of
good cause in the motion to compel. 182
The best system is to make production available based on the
same standards applicable to other discovery procedures. No justifi-
cation for these special showings has been articulated by the states
which mandate them,18 3 and such provisions lead to incongruous re-
sults. For example, requiring a special showing to compel production
from a nonparty when no extra showing must be made to depose the
nonparty is inconsistent,' 8 4 especially since complying with a deposi-
tion often imposes a greater burden on the nonparty than producing
things or permitting inspection. Furthermore, if multiple methods
for production exist,' 8 5 imposing additional standards for some meth-
182 Id.
183 One rationale for these special showings is that nonparties have a right to privacy, a
right not to be involved in other people's litigation unless it is absolutely necessary. The
..mere witness" rule, discussed in notes 124-34supra and accompanying text, may have been
another manifestation of this policy. See generally Hughes & Anderson, supra note 100.
A second rationale for imposing an extra burden before compelling production by non-
parties is that this is a fairly new and untested practice and should be approached cautiously.
This is one reason why a good cause requirement was first included in Federal Rule 34 in
regard to production from parties. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee notes ("The
good cause requirement was originally inserted in Rule 34 as a general protective provision in
the absence of experience with the specific problems that would arise thereunder.").
New York Rule 3101(a)(4) requires that a special circumstance be shown before produc-
tion is available from nonparties, but the Practice Commentary following that rule not only
offers no justification for the requirement but actually urges trial judges to ignore it:
It is submitted that disclosure against a nonparty witness should be just as
broad in the state practice as it is in the federal. The only barrier is CPLR
3101(a)(4), and that is truly a nominal one. Even hostility of such a witness should
not be a necessary showing. A mere showing by the lawyer that he needs such
witness's pretrial deposition in order to prepare fully for the trial should suffice as a
"special circumstance." If the trial judges hold that it suffices, they will have met
the language of paragraph (4), implemented the Court of Appeals' aims in the
Allen case, and removed from all competition a factor which has often influenced a
plaintiff's lawyer with a choice of forums to select the federal one on the simple
ground that the state practice includes a serious obstacle to pretrial preparation.
If a witness holds the key, or merely a key, to any substantial fact involved in
the case, how can any lawyer in this day and age be compelled to go to trial with-
out knowing intimately what that witness is going to say?
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. § 3101(a)(4) comment C3101:22.
184 Compare OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3211 (West Supp. 1982) (party must show sub-
stantial need for the materials and inability without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent elsewhere before production from nonparty will be ordered) with OKLA,. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 3207 (no showing of need required for deposition of nonparty); and compare
TEX. R. Civ. P. 176(4) (necessity must be shown for production from nonparty) with TEX.
R. Civ. P. 186(a) (no showing of necessity required for deposition of nonparty).
185 See notes 201-03 in/ra nd accompanying text.
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ods but not others may cause confusion.18 6 Finally, some of the par-
ticular standards adopted by the states contain specific flaws. As
previously mentioned, the New York courts have interpreted the
term "special circumstances" to amount to such a minimal require-
ment that the concept is meaningless. 8 7 "Good cause" and "neces-
sity" are difficult to define consistently; 18 8 this difficulty is one reason
why the "good cause" requirement was dropped from Federal Rule
34 in 1970.189 Of the higher standards which the states have im-
posed, the Oklahoma work product standard is the most susceptible
to meaningful and consistent judicial application. Even so, the re-
quirement remains a target for the general criticisms noted above.
Thus, the best approach is to impose no higher standard.
The states extending Rule 34 to nonparties differ as to the
amount of information which the party must include in the papers
served on the nonparty. This variation is especially pronounced in
states where production is primarily extrajudicial. Alabama requires
only that the subpoena advise the recipient of his right to object at
186 For example, in Oklahoma, to compel production alone, the discovering party must
demonstrate need and hardship, see note 159 supra. However no comparable special showing
is required to compel production by subpoena duces tecum. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 3207. The risk of not meeting the greater showing required for production alone encour-
ages discovering parties to use the subpoena duces tecum procedure, even if a deposition is
unnecessary or inconvenient. As a result, all the benefits which would accrue from allowing
production alone are undermined. To avoid such a result, the Oklahoma courts might super-
impose the need and hardship prerequisites on the subpoena duces tecum method of produc-
tion.
A comparable situation existed under the Federal Rules with regard to production from
parties before 1970, when a motion for production included a good cause requirement but a
subpoena duces tecum did not. The federal courts resolved the incongruity by imposing a
good cause requirement for production by subpoena duces tecum. See, e.g., Cooney v. Sun
Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968); LaChance v. Service Truck-
ing Co., 215 F. Supp. 159 (D. Md. 1963); Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc. v. E.J. Korvette, Inc.,
198 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See generally C. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 164, § 2457
(1971 & Supp. 1983).
187 See note 177 supra.
188 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee notes ("The major difficulties
visible in the existing case law are (1) confusion and disagreement as to whether 'good cause'
is made out by a showing of relevance and lack of privilege, or requires an additional showing
of necessity . .
189 Id. The Advisory Committee stated:
The rules are amended by eliminating the general requirement of 'good cause'
from Rule 34 but retaining a requirement of a special showing for trial preparation
materials in this subdivision. The required showing is expressed, not in terms of
'good cause' whose generality has tended to encourage confusion and controversy,
but in terms of the elements of the special showing to be made; substantial need of
the materials in the preparation of the case and inability without undue hardship
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.
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any time before the compliance date. 190 Indiana goes further, requir-
ing extensive advice to the nonparty; the request for production must
not only inform the nonparty that he is entitled to security against
any damages which the production causes but also it must advise the
nonparty of all the responses that may be made to the request.' 9 '
Thus, the nonparty is informed that possible responses include sub-
mitting to the terms of the request, proposing different terms, ob-
jecting specifically or generally with a written response, and moving
to quash the request.' 92 Finally, at the other extreme of the extraju-
dicial states is Georgia. The Georgia rule does not require that the
party furnish the nonparty with any information. 93
The three states which allow production from nonparties on mo-
tion and order do not require that the motion papers provide the
nonparty with any information regarding his rights. 94 Presumably
this omission reflects the conclusion that requiring a court order for
production sufficiently protects the nonparty, obviating the need to
advise the nonparty of his rights.
The decision not to supply any information to the nonparty is
reasonable when a motion and order procedure is used, because the
court will undoubtedly protect the nonparty. But in states authoriz-
ing extrajudicial productions, the nonparty should be supplied with
the maximum information in the request for production or accompa-
nying subpoena for two reasons. First, receipt of this information
reduces the likelihood that the nonparty would blindly comply with
an objectionable request or subpoena. For example, in Georgia,
where the rule does not require that any information be given the
190 AL . R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) ("The subpoena shall advise the recipient of the right to
object at any time prior to the date set forth in the subpoena for compliance therewith.").
This advice is no doubt helpful, but it does not inform the recipient of how to assert his or her
objection. The method of objection is important, because the very next sentence of the rule
states, "Such objection shall be communicated in writing to the party serving the subpoena."
It would be a simple matter to require the subpoena to advise the recipient of his right to
object by writing to the party serving the subpoena. Cf IND. R. TRIAL P. 34(C), see note 192
zi1fa.
191 IND. R. TRIAL P. 34(C).
192 Id. (the request must state "that the witness or person to whom it is directed is entitled
to security against damages or payment of damages resulting from such request and may
respond to such request by submitting to its terms, by proposing different terms, by objecting
specifically or generally to the request by serving a written response to the party making the
request within thirty 1301 days, or by moving to quash as permitted by Rule 45(B)."). This
rule, unlike the comparable Alabama rule discussed in note 190,supra. specifically informs the
nonparty how to assert his objections.
193 GA. CODE ANN. 9-11-34(c) (1982).
194 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. § 3120(b) (McKinney 1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12. § 3211(c)
(West Supp. 1982); TEx. R. Civ. P. 167(4).
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nonparty,' 95 the recipient of a production request might think he had
no choice but to supply the material. Second, supplying extensive
information minimizes the chance of burdening the nonparty with
retaining an attorney for advice on how to respond to the sub-
poena.' 96 So in Indiana, for example, where the request for produc-
tion must inform the nonparty recipient of all the responses that may
be made and how to make them, it is much less likely that the non-
party would be compelled to hire a lawyer.' 97 Moreover, providing
extensive information to the nonparty results in no burden or cost;
only a few more paragraphs are necessary in the printed subpoena or
the production request form.
Of the three states using the extrajudicial approach, Indiana re-
quires not only the most extensive but also the most useful advice.
For example, while under the Alabama rule the party must advise
the nonparty of his right to object, 98 the nonparty does not have to
be advised of how to assert this right. In contrast, the Indiana xule
provides that the nonparty be informed that he may object specifi-
cally or generally by serving a written response to the party making
the request within thirty days.' 99 Clearly, the Indiana system would
be more useful to a lay person desiring to contest the production.
All of these state variations of Federal Rule 34 authorize access
to both mobile and immobile property.200 Thus the question arises
whether the other methods for discovery of a nonparty's property-
subpoenas duces tecum and independent actions-remain available
in these states. All six states still have provisions authorizing subpoe-
nas duces tecum. 20 The litigants in these states have a choice when
seeking production of mobile things: they can use a request/motion
for production or a subpoena duces tecum.20 2 As to independent ac-
tions for production, most of the states have no provision in the dis-
195 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-34(c) (1982).
196 See note 33 supra.
197 IND. R. TRIAL P. 34(C); see note 157 supra.
198 ALA. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B).
199 See IND. R. TRIAL P. 34(C).
200 All the rules provide for production of documents and things and for entry upon land.
ALA. R. Civ. P. 34(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-34(9) (1982); IND. R. TRIAL P. 34(C); N.Y.
CiV. PRAC. R. § 3120(a) (McKinney 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3211(A) (West Supp.
1982); Tix. R. Civ. P. 167(1).
201 ALA. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-45(a)(1) (1982); IND. R. TRIAL P. 45;
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. 3111 (McKinney 1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3207(c)(5) (West Supp.
1982); TEx. R. Civ. P. 201(2).
202 The Practice Commentaries following New York Rule 3111, the subpoena duces te-
cum provision, explain when production by subpoena duces tecum should be used and when
production by motion under Rule 3120 should be used. The Commentaries state in part:
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covery rules comparable to Federal Rule 34(c), but Oklahoma does
have an independent action provision identical to Federal Rule
34(c).203
Although other distinctions in the methods of production from
nonparties exist among these states,20 4 the variations are not signifi-
If the party seeking the disclosure is not interested in taking a deposition but
merely wants a party or witness to produce for discovery and inspection a paper or
other tangible item in his possession, his remedy is an outright discovery notice or
order under CPLR 3120 ...
CPLR 3111 is an analogous but more limited device. It is used to require the
deponent to produce the paper or thing in conjunction with a deposition and for
use upon it.
The New York cases echo this distinction and hold that production pursuant to sub-
poena duces tecum is generally more limited and may be sought only insofar as the produc-
tion is incidental to a deposition. See Grow Const. Co. v. State, 54 Misc. 2d 108, 281 N.Y.S.2d
454 (1967); Revyuk v. Dunbar, 12 Misc. 2d 713, 179 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1957).
203 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3211(D) (West Supp. 1982) ("This section does not pre-
clude an independent action against a person not a party for production of documents and
things and permission to enter upon land."). Theoretically, then, in Oklahoma, the litigant
may choose whether to pursue production from a nonparty through a motion for production
under § 3211(C) or an independent action under § 3211 (D). However, the Oklahoma courts
will likely follow the lead of Home Insurance Co. and hold independent actions available only
when production can be achieved no other way. See text accompanying notes 15-17supra.
204 For example, the states have different systems for objections to production. The states
which allow extrajudicial production have generally similar schemes. In Georgia, either the
nonparty or any party may object to the request by filing a written objection with its bases;
the party seeking discovery must then file a motion to compel. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-34(c)
(1982).
In Alabama, the rule provides for objections at two stages. First, when the party seeking
discovery files a notice of intent to serve a subpoena, "any person or party" may serve an
objection within ten days. ALA. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A). (Construing this rule literally to
allow "any person" to object to the production could lead to some absurd results, if, for
example, a person totally uninvolved in the litigation asserted a right to object under the rule.
Probably the drafters merely intended the word "person" to refer to the nonparty from whom
production is sought. Later in the rule, the nonparty is referred to as the "recipient" of the
subpoena, but that term was not available for the provision under discussion because this
provision deals with a stage in the process when no subpoena has yet been issued so there is
not yet any "recipient." The rule as currently drafted is obviously overbroad and the Ala-
bama courts should interpret the word "person" to include only the nonparty from whom
production is sought.). If an objection is served, the subpoena is not issued, and the party
seeking discovery must file a Rule 37(a) motion to compel. If no objection is served, the
subpoena is issued, and at this second stage, the recipient has the right to object at any time
before the date set for compliance. ALA. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B). This two-stage process was
modeled on Florida Rule 1.351 which authorizes subpoenas for production without deposi-
tions. The Committee Comments following Alabama Rule 34 state: "At about the time the
committee was involved in its study of Rule 34, the supreme court of Florida promulgated
some new rules governing production of documents and things without deposition (citation
omitted). Borrowing some aspects of that Florida rule, the committee came forward with the
proposed revision of Rule 34(b)." See text accompanying notes 66-85, supra. If the recipient
objects, the party seeking discovery is again left to a motion to compel.
In Indiana, all the parties as well as the nonparty may object. IND. R. TRIAL P. 34(C).
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cant. Of the six diverse systems, the Indiana approach is the sound-
est for several reasons. Indiana uses the subpoena method, a superior
approach to the motion and order procedure since it conserves judi-
cial resources. 205 The Indiana rule clearly provides for personal juris-
diction through the subpoena requirement.20 6  It imposes no
prerequisite of an extraordinary showing and so avoids the uncer-
tainty and incongruities associated with those requirements.20 7 Fi-
nally, the Indiana rule mandates that the request for production
provide the nonparty with extensive and useful information. 20 8
IV. Alternatives for the Federal System
The federal rules on production of nonparties' things contain
two major weaknesses. First, mobile things are only discoverable
with subpoenas duces tecum, which entail unnecessary deposi-
tions. 20 9 Second, immobile things are only discoverable through un-
certain and wasteful independent actions. 210 Either of two possible
changes could remedy these weaknesses: amendment of Rule 45 or
amendment of Rule 34.
Rule 45 could be revised to delete the deposition prerequisite so
that a pure subpoena for production of things was available. 21' The
new Florida rule essentially adopted this change. 21 2 Such an amend-
ment would cure the unwanted deposition weakness, but to solve the
independent action problem, Rule 45 would need" further amend-
ment to allow subpoenas for inspection of immobile things. Amend-
ing Rule 45 to provide subpoenas for inspection of immobile things
If an objection is made, the party seeking production must file a motion to compel under
Rule 34(a). Id.
In contrast with these specific objection provisions, two of the states which provide for
production by motion and order have enacted no objection provisions directed specifically to
this discovery device. The New York and Oklahoma provisions are silent as to objections,
and the issue is left to the general discovery provisions. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. § 3120(b) (Mc-
Kinney 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 12, § 3211(c) (West Supp. 1982).
205 See text accompanying notes 156-66 supra.
206 See text accompanying notes 167-73 supra.
207 See text accompanying notes 174-89 .upra.
208 See text accompanying notes 190-99 supra.
209 See notes 7-61 supra and accompanying text.
210 See notes 86-152 supra and accompanying text.
211 Such an amendment was suggested inJ. CoUNDJ. FRIEDE.NTHAL & A. MILLER,Supra
note 100, at 665 ("Why shouldn't Rule 45 be amended to provide for production of items for
pretrial inspection without the artificial deposition requirement?"), and in J.B. LEVINE, supra
note 146, at 104 ("Rule 45(d)(1) should be amended so that a subpoena duces tecum may
command a non-party to produce documents or movable property for inspection at a reason-
able place and time.").
212 See notes 66-85 supra and accompanying text.
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was the solution suggested by one commentator critical of independ-
ent actions. 21 3 However, no jurisdiction has adopted such an amend-
ment. The courts should not make these changes in Rule 45 through
different judicial interpretations of the current language, however;214
instead, the text of Rule 45(d) should be amended 2' 5 or a new rule
213 See Note, supra note 91, at 120-22; cf. note 165 supra.
214 Arguably, the current language of Rule 45(d) could merely be reinterpreted by the
courts to allow pure subpoenas for production and subpoenas for inspection of immobile
things. Rule 45(d) states in relevant part:
(d) Subpoena for Taking Depositions; Place of Examination.
(1) Proof of service of a notice to take a deposition as provided in Rule 30(b)
and 31(a) constitutes a sufficient authorization for the issuance by the clerk of the
district court for the district in which the deposition is to be taken of subpoenas for
the persons named or described therein. Proof of service may be made by filing
with the clerk of the district court for the district in which the deposition is to be
taken a copy of the notice together with a statement of the date and manner of
service and of the names of the person served, certified by the person who made
service. The subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to produce
and permit inspection and copying of designated books, papers, documents, or tan-
gible things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of the examina-
tion permitted by Rule 26(b), but in that event the subpoena will be subject to the
provisions of Rule 26(c) and subdivision (b) of this rule.
FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d).
The sentence which states, "The subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed
to produce and permit inspection and copying of designated books, papers, documents or
tangible things..." does not by its terms require a deposition and could be interpreted to
authorize a subpoena for production without a deposition. Further, that sentence could be
interpreted to allow subpoenas for entry upon land as it authorizes subpoenas for the inspec-
tion of tangible things. While the desired changes in Rule 45(d) might be achieved solely
through court reinterpretation, this is a poor way to make the changes for several reasons.
First, such reinterpretation would render part of the title of the rule, "Subpoena for Taking
Depositions," misleading. Second, the rule authorizes the clerk to issue a subpoena only after
a notice of deposition has been served, and since there would be no deposition in connection
with the new subpoenas for production only or for inspection of immobile things, the clerk
would be without authority to issue subpoenas. Third, it is ill advised to make such a rela-
tively drastic change in practice without revising the text of the rule because the fact that the
text of the rule went unchanged might be confusing and make the change in procedure un-
necessarily complex.
215 The title of Rule 45(d) would be changed to "Subpoena for Taking Depositions, Pro-
duction or Inspection; Place of Examination." A provision similar to Rule 30(d)(1) would be
added requiring that a party seeking production or entry upon land give notice to the other
parties, and the first sentence of Rule 45(d)(1) would be amended to make proof of service of
such notice sufficient authorization for the clerk to issue the subpoena. The second and third
sentences would be amended as follows (new matter in italics):
Proof of service may be made by filing with the clerk of the district court for the
district in which the deposition is to be taken or the production or inspection is to occur a
copy of the notice together with a statement of the date and manner of service and
of the names of the persons served, certified by the person who made service. The
subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to give his deposition, to
produce and permit inspection and copying of designated books, papers, docu-
ments, or tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of
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added.216
If these changes were effected, the current production methods
would need adjustment. The subpoena duces tecum procedure could
either be deleted or retained. If it were deleted, parties could use the
pure production subpoena first and then, if necessary, schedule a
deposition to examine the nonparty on the things produced, much
like the current practice with regard to parties.21 7 If the subpoena
duces tecum remained available, the discovering party could use
either it or the pure production subpoena. The discovering party
would have a choice of procedures and would not be compelled to
schedule a deposition to get production, so presumably discovering
parties would only use the subpoena duces tecum procedure when a
deposition was warranted and convenient.2 18 New York has had
such an option in its discovery rules for several years,219 and although
the examination permitted by Rule 25(b), and to pernit ent,7 upon designated land or
other property for the purpose of ispection within the scope permitted by Rule 34(a)(2), but
in that event the subpoena will be subject to the provisions of Rule 26(c) and subdi-
vision (b) of this rule.
The last insertion, regarding entry upon land, was suggested in Note, supra note 89, at 121
n.59. As that commentator notes, there would also have to be minor changes in the second
paragraph of Rule 45(d)(1) and Rule 27.
216 Such a rule might read as follows:
45(g) For Production Without Deposition; for Inspection of Land or Other Prop-
erty
A party desiring production of books, papers, documents, or tangible things
from any person or inspection of land or other property of any person shall give
reasonable notice in writing to every other party to the action. Proof of service of a
notice of production or inspection constitutes a sufficient authorization for the issu-
ance by the clerk of the district court for the district in which the production or
inspection is to occur of subpoenas for the persons named or described therein.
Proof of service may be made by filing with the clerk of the district court in which
the production or inspection is to occur a copy of the notice together with a state-
ment of the date and manner of service and the names of the persons served, certi-
fied by the person to whom it is directed to produce and permit inspection and
copying of designated books, papers, documents, or tangible things which consti-
tute or contain matters within the scope of the examination permitted by Rule
26(b), and to permit inspection of designated land or other property within the
scope permitted by Rule 34(a)(2). The subpoena will be subject to the provisions of
Rule 26(c) and subdivision (b) of this rule.
217 Under the federal rules relating to discovery from parties, a litigant who wants to
examine a party on documents or things generally files a request for production under Fed-
eral Rule 34, reviews the documents or things, and then arranges a deposition of the relevant
party under Federal Rule 30.
218 Thus, a discovering party would use a subpoena duces tecum only when he or she
definitely anticipated some questions about the things produced and further knew the things
would not be so voluminous or complex as to require extensive preparation to ask effective
questions. See text accompanying notes 54-61 supra.
219 See note 201 supra.
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the actual distinction between a subpoena for production and a sub-
poena duces tecum is difficult to articulate, 220 the existence of multi-
ple production methods has presented no problems.
While the subpoena duces tecum provisions could be retained or
deleted with no harmful impact, Rule 34(c), the independent action
provision, should definitely be deleted. Since subpoenas would be
available for discovery of immobile things, independent actions
would be unnecessary and undesirable; the courts should deem that
the new provisions preempt independent actions. 22'
An extention of Rule 34 to nonparties is the second way to elimi-
nate the weaknesses in the federal rules. This revision would provide
for discovery of both mobile and immobile property 222 and thereby
remedy both the problems of the unwanted deposition and the in-
dependent action. The Advisory Committee described such an ex-
tension of Rule 34 as "ideal," 223 and several states have adopted this
approach.2 24 The Indiana discovery system provides the best model
of this approach.2 25 The impact of such a revision on subpoenas du-
ces tecum and independent actions would be similar to the impact of
revising Rule 45;226 the subpoena duces tecum procedure could be
deleted or retained with no harmful consequences, but Rule 34(c)
should be deleted and independent actions deemed preempted.
V. Conclusion
Ultimately, the proper amendment of either Rule 45 or Rule 34
achieves the same result: a party may subpoena a nonparty to pro-
duce things or allow entry upon land for inspection of immobile
things. 227 Both approaches have the benefit of eliminating the proce-
dural distinctions in discovery of mobile and immobile property. Be-
220 See note 202 supra.
221 Under the holding of Home Insurance, see text accompanying notes 15-16 supra, in-
dependent actions are only available if the production cannot be compelled by any other
method. Once subpoenas for inspection of immobile things are available, therefore, in-
dependent actions could not be used for discovery, and arguably Rule 34(c) would not need
to be deleted. Even so, it seems wiser to delete Rule 34(c), making it that much clearer that
the comprehensive production rules preempt independent actions for production.
222 Rule 34 provides for production of mobile things and inspection of immobile things.
FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
223 FED. R. Civ. P. 34(c), advisory committee notes. See note 96 supra.
224 See notes 154-208 supra and accomanying text.
225 See text accompanying notes 205-08 supra.
226 See text accompanying notes 217-21 supra.
227 Of course, the result is the same only if the extension of Rule 34 to nonparties is ac-
complished with the subpoena model rather than the less desirable motion and order model.
See text accompanying notes 161-66 supra.
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tween these approaches, amendment of Rule 34 seems marginally
preferable. First, amending Rule 34, the rule on production, is a
more direct method of compelling production from nonparties than
amending Rule 45, the rule on subpoenas. Second, the Advisory
Committee appears inclined to make the change through amend-
ment of Rule 34 rather than through amendment of Rule 45.228
Third, several states have chosen to compel production from nonpar-
ties via extension of Rule 34,229 and their experience can be moni-
tored for guidance.
228 See note 96 supra.
229 See notes 154-208 supra and accompanying text.
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